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PREFACE
Although the American economy has enjoyed unprecedented growth since 
the early 1980s, it has substantially accelerated its transition from goods pro 
duction to service employment. One result of this has been a shift in job op 
portunities from the hands of American workers to their minds. More than 
ever before, blue-collar jobs are being replaced by new white-collar oppor 
tunities in the professional, sales, and administrative support fields. Employers 
are also increasingly demanding workers with up-to-date skills who can per 
form successfully in a more complex and demanding workplace. To succeed 
in today©s labor market, it is clear that workers must be well equipped with 
relevant and quality education and training.
While these changes may be to the benefit of the American economy, they 
have also displaced and caused hardship among millions of workers. Blue- 
collar workers and those from the manufacturing sector have been particular 
ly hard hit as a result of mismatches between the skills they possess and those 
required in the economy©s growing sectors. Even among all displaced workers, 
the postlayoff readjustment process does not characterize conventional attributes 
of a flexible labor market. While the American economy may have produced 
unprecedented growth, many segments of the labor force have been unable 
to benefit from it.
If these developments were simply the result of recent economic changes, 
they could be viewed as temporary and requiring short-term adjustment policies. 
By all accounts, however, they are part of a long-term trend which accelerated 
in the early 1980s, and which is projected to continue well into the future. 
Jobs are expected to change even more frequently than in the past; they are 
also projected to require more complex and higher levels of education and 
training. At the same time, fewer workers will be available to fill these jobs. 
Between now and the year 2000, the nation©s labor force is expected to grow 
more slowly and age more rapidly than at any time since the 1930s. These 
trends will make flexible labor market adjustment even more important than 
in the past, and particularly among experienced mature workers such as those 
recently displaced from their jobs. From a policy perspective, this makes it 
very clear that facilitating the movement of workers from one job to another 
will continue as a major challenge for the future.
The motivation for this book was supplied not only by the timeliness of the 
subject, but also by certain observations about the nature of the problem and 
policies to ameliorate it. After nearly seven years of experience designing 
policies and operating programs for displaced workers, it has become evident 
that we have only a limited capacity to help these workers find new jobs that 
make the most of their skills and accumulated experience. We are, for sure,
adept at facilitating reemployment and operating efficient programs, but we 
are less able to cope with the programming and resource requirements 
associated with substantive retraining for jobs that offer wages comparable 
to those earned at the time of layoff.
Resolving this issue is a complex matter that involves several important con 
siderations. Perhaps most fundamental is understanding how changes in the 
structure of jobs affect the postiayoff adjustment process and policies to facilitate 
it. Since shifts in the nature of job opportunities largely define both the prob 
lem and solution for worker displacement, one cannot help but ask how they 
might shape worker adjustment patterns as well as the feasibility of alternative 
policy strategies. Addressing this question is at the heart of effective public 
employment and training policy and forms much of the basis of this book.
The purpose of this book is to convey to a broad audience an appreciation 
of how the structure of job opportunities has changed over the past 20 years, 
and to link these changes to the issues of displacement policy and worker mobili 
ty. This is accomplished by examining national and regional data over time 
and also by analyzing the labor market experience of workers displaced from 
their jobs between 1981 and 1986. On the basis of the information presented 
in this book, we hope to contribute to a better understanding of the worker 
adjustment process and the challenges that future policy will face in address 
ing it.
In preparing this book, support was forthcoming from several parties. We 
are grateful to the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research for pro 
viding financial support. We also appreciate the helpful guidance and advice 
provided by our friends and colleagues. Dr. Louis Jacobson of the Upjohn 
Institute helped immensely in Grafting the analysis plan and commenting on 
early drafts. Dr. Howard Bloom of New York University and Ms. Jane Kulik 
of Abt Associates also offered helpful advice on early drafts of the book. Final 
ly, none of this would have been possible without the continued support and 
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Worker Adjustment in Perspective
Those who embrace economic development as a goal must accept 
change. New products, services, and production processes require the 
reorganization of capital and labor, the building of new machines, and 
the learning of new skills. With adaptation to the new, comes elimi 
nation of the old; a dynamic economy is by definition one that chal 
lenges tradition. Like the village giving way to the city and agriculture 
to industry, economic development is an evolutionary process which 
reminds us of Darwinian natural selection.
Despite the similarities between natural and economic evolution, the 
comparison is as dangerous as it is misleading. The natural world 
operates through a violent, but elegant, barbarism. Economic de 
velopment, on the other hand, can be barbaric, but need not be so. At 
its worst, "progress" destroys communities, leaving workers and 
their families unemployed without usable skills, and vulnerable to 
personal and financial loss. At its best, change is (using the econo 
mist©s term) "Pareto optimal," creating an overall benefit without 
harming anyone in particular. In the history of our country, it is doubt 
ful that any episode of economic development was Pareto optimal, but 
this does not alter the fact that growth is a social process subject to our 
control.
All countries that pursue the goal of economic development and 
change have institutions to support the flexible allocation of workers 
and capital. Japan©s system of lifetime employment, for example, 
allows for the retraining and reallocation of workers within the firm 
(though there is obviously limited interfirm mobility). In Sweden, 
where layoffs are more common, the state and its labor market boards
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play an important role in the readjustment process. In the United 
States, we have developed a system closer to the free market ideal, in 
which the price of growth is paid in large part by the workers affected 
by change.
The human cost associated with economic change leads to tension in 
all economic systems. In the U.S., the latest wave of change has 
purged hundreds of thousands of workers from their jobs, most in the 
goods-producing sectors. Many of these job-losers have suffered sub 
stantially, experiencing long periods of joblessness and declining real 
earnings. Understandably, workers remaining in goods-production and 
other mature industries have sharpened their concerns about job secu 
rity. The industrial relations system has formed the beginning of a 
response in the shape of negotiated settlements that better protect 
workers from layoff. In return, workers have ceded to management 
demands for wage moderation and more intracompany flexibility.
These changes are slowly moving throughout the economy, repre 
senting a free market "contract renegotiation" in response to the risks 
of economic change. But in the main, the U.S. system continues to 
rely on the opportunities created through the unrestricted ability of 
employers to lay off workers, to close plants, and to move capital. ! For 
the most part, our society has embraced this flexibility and the hard 
ship associated with it as an essential ingredient within a dynamic 
economy.
The public policy response to displacement pressures in the United 
States has been tentative and experimental, exerting little fundamental, 
institutional influence upon the panorama of growth and change. Iron 
ically, the public policies that have most recently affected the level and 
nature of displacement from manufacturing and other trade-sensitive 
sectors have done so unintentionally. The deep recession at the begin 
ning of this decade largely an anti-inflation strategy brought manu 
facturing to its knees. Expansionary fiscal policy since that time, in 
combination with tight money, maintained real interest rates at a high 
level and drove up the value of the dollar. When combined with tax 
reform legislation and a doubling of real military spending, these pol 
icies resulted in an unprecedented, noninflationary economic expan 
sion. But the strong dollar and high real interest rates also created a
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favorable climate for the consumption of imports and for foreign in 
vestment, while sales by American manufacturers suffered in both 
domestic and foreign markets.
The macroeconomic policies of the early 1980s were not in and of 
themselves a fundamental cause of the long-term decline in goods- 
production. The movement of employment away from manufacturing 
and into services has been part of a long-term trend. The type and mix 
of fiscal and monetary policies did, however, work to accelerate the 
rate of change. What might have been a rising tide of transition became 
a wave of plant closings and layoffs. According to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, almost 11 million workers were displaced from their jobs 
because of plant closings or employment cutbacks in the five years 
leading up to January 1986. 2 Despite the economic expansion, which 
began in October 1982, the General Accounting Office has estimated 
that over 16,000 establishments with 50 or more employees either 
closed altogether or permanently laid off workers during 1983 and 
1984 alone. 3
A unique feature of recent economic change is the effect it has had 
on the mobility of workers. For the 11 million displaced workers, the 
road to recovery became blurred by large-scale changes in the com 
position and hiring requirements of jobs. At the same time that 
blue-collar jobs were giving way to new, white-collar opportunities, 
employers were increasingly demanding better educated and trained 
workers. One result of this was the emergence of (human capital) 
gaps in the education and hiring requirements of declining and grow 
ing jobs. High-wage jobs as well as low-wage jobs were taking on a 
new character, shifting from goods-production to service industries, 
and from the "hands" of the workers to their "minds." In this envi 
ronment, job loss often meant long-term unemployment and earnings 
loss.
Against this backdrop of change, the federal government instituted 
new policies and programs to facilitate the transition of workers to new 
jobs. Whether it be through retraining, remedial education, or simply 
job search assistance, these policies and programs were intended to 
help workers find new, meaningful jobs as the economy continued its 
long-term shift from goods-production to service employment.
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The Legislative and Program Framework
In the labor market, the policy approach has been to focus more on 
ameliorating the effects of change rather than on modifying the process 
of change itself. Training and education for employed workers are 
viewed largely as a private responsibility for the employer and em 
ployee to negotiate. Despite the increasingly important role of skills- 
upgrading, the public©s strategy is to assist workers only after the 
process of change has affected them.
The closest the United States has come to an institutionalized policy 
which facilitates economic change while protecting workers has been 
the varied set of displaced worker programs in place, on and off, since 
1961. The most recent long term program Employment and Training 
Assistance for Dislocated Workers was established under Title HI of 
the Job Training Partnership Act (JPTA) of 1982. This program, 
recently replaced by the Economic Dislocation Worker Adjustment 
Assistance Act, was administered by the states, who received an 
annual, formula-based allocation to assist dislocated workers in 
obtaining unsubsidized employment. Eligibility for the program was 
left to the discretion of the states within broadly established 
guidelines. These guidelines were intended to direct Title III to 
individuals unlikely to return to their old industries and occupations 
by focusing on those who:
(1) have been terminated or laid off or who have received a 
notice of termination or layoff from employment, are eligible 
for or have exhausted their entitlement to unemployment 
compensation, and are unlikely to return to their previous 
industry or occupation;
(2) have been terminated, or who have received a notice of 
termination of employment, as a result of any permanent 
closure of a plant or facility; or
(3) are long-term unemployed and have limited opportuni 
ties for employment or reemployment in the same or a sim 
ilar occupation in the area in which such individuals reside, 
including any older individuals who may have substantial 
barriers to employment by reason of age.
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The implicit goal of Title III was to reemploy as many dislocated 
workers as feasible in new, expanding occupations and industries, and 
to do so through retraining and related program services. The legisla 
tion provided states with substantial discretion in selecting an appro 
priate mix of services from among a long list of authorized activities, 
such as job search assistance, occupation skills training, relocation 
assistance, and supportive services.
While the intention of Title III was to provide states with the flex 
ibility to develop programs to meet their own unique needs, most 
adopted a relatively short-term intervention strategy, acting much like 
a safety net for workers unable to cope successfully with the pace and 
nature of economic change. During the first three full program years, 
stretching from July 1984 to June 1987, the states spent roughly $538 
million to serve some 386,000 individuals. At an average cost of 
$1,400 and a 20-week mean duration of participation, Title III did not 
emerge as a major force in retraining America©s unemployed work 
force for tomorrow©s jobs.
Several factors have contributed to this. For one thing, the absolute 
level of Title III funding has been sufficient to serve only a small 
proportion of all potentially eligible dislocated workers. Between 1981 
and January 1986, for example, 1.75 million workers 20 to 61 years of 
age were displaced from full-time private sector jobs annually. 4 As 
suming the average cost of $1,400, nearly $2.5 billion would be re 
quired to serve these individuals at current investment levels, well 
above the annual Title III allocation. Even if we grant that 60 percent 
of these individuals will obtain employment themselves, nearly $1 
billion would still be needed to serve just over 700,000 dislocated 
workers each year. For state and program operators faced with a po 
tential demand for training assistance that well exceeds existing ca 
pacity, it is quite natural for them to spread available resources across 
as many individuals as feasible.
Limited dollars does not imply that increased funding levels will 
necessarily lead to more costly and lengthy investments. Rather, a 
natural response to higher funding levels would be to extend services 
to a larger fraction of the eligible population. Indeed, the experience 
under Title HI suggests that when faced with funding increases, states
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chose to expand rather than intensify their service strategies. As shown 
below, program expenditures increased over the first three years of Title 
III, and so did the number of individuals served; as expected, the mean 
duration of stay (a reasonable proxy for investment intensity) remained 
fairly stable.
JTPA Title III Program Expenditures, Service 



















SOURCE: Job Training Annual Status Report, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. 
Department of Labor, unpublished data.
Beyond funding levels, the personal costs of program participation 
also contributed to the short-term program strategy adopted under Title 
III. To begin, most dislocated workers qualify for unemployment in 
surance (UI) and a large proportion of them exhaust their benefits 
within the standard 26-week time frame. Since Title III was not, by 
design, intended to extend the UI benefit period, and because support 
ive services (including subsistence payments) were limited to 15 per 
cent of total program expenditures, longer-term program participation 
was contingent upon workers finding alternative sources of income, 
such as night jobs, the earnings of other family members, and savings. 
For that matter, the very participation in JTPA can be a costly endeavor 
since unemployed dislocated workers need a job as much as they may 
need some measure of retraining.
As a result, unless they offered the promise of immediate reemploy- 
ment, programs experienced substantial difficulty attracting dislocated 
workers. Available evidence indicates that dislocated workers are re 
luctant to enroll in employment and training programs partly because 
of their focus on rapid reemployment. 5 According to a recent GAO 
study, for example, only 26 percent of Title III participants received 
classroom skills training, while 66 percent received job search
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assistance. 6 Moreover, of those who did receive training, their median 
duration of program participation was only nine weeks.
No doubt, even these modest investments have alleviated some of the 
private and possibly social costs of displacement. Placement rates under 
Title III have been high 70 percent during the 12-month program year 
ending in June 1987 and workers have been able to average $6.33 an 
hour on their new jobs. 7 Whether the program©s investments have 
helped dislocated workers achieve employment and earnings levels 
above what would have otherwise occurred, however, is another issue. 
So too is the issue of earnings loss. While Title III programs may be 
able to affect earnings favorably, it is still quite plausible for workers 
to experience significant declines relative to the layoff job.
Indeed, this mixed result has emerged in several studies of the 
effectiveness of employment and training programs for displaced 
workers. 8 Despite evidence showing favorable earnings impacts, dis 
placed workers still earned less than they did on their layoff job. In one 
study of several demonstration projects established by the state of 
Texas, for example, workers experienced an average earnings loss of 
approximately 33 percent, despite the presence of earnings gains. 9 
This result is not qualitatively different from the national experience of 
dislocated workers and highlights the reemployment focus of the JTPA 
program.
The result also points up how recent shifts in the structure of job 
opportunities have frustrated the efforts of employment and training 
programs to facilitate worker adjustment to economic change. The 
primary issue here has to do with occupational and industry job- 
changing.
As commonly defined, displaced workers are individuals who have 
lost their jobs through no fault of their own and who are unlikely to 
return to their old industries and occupations. Several studies have 
shown that about half of displaced workers obtaining reemployment 
actually return to their same broad industry and occupational groups, 
however. 10 Largely as a result of emerging human capital gaps, those 
who do change industries and occupations are found to be most likely 
to experience an earnings loss. Absent retraining and education ser 
vices that enable workers to obtain comparable-wage jobs, the implicit
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goal of Title III to move workers to new, growing sectors may well 
come in conflict with a worker©s primary objective of limiting earnings 
loss.
This conflict is at the heart of developing effective employment and 
training programs for dislocated workers. While JTPA is focused on 
the goal of reemployment, per se, it is difficult to divorce it totally 
from the issue of earnings loss. Changes in the structure of job op 
portunities, together with worker interest in minimizing earnings loss, 
leave reemployment as a necessary but often insufficient condition for 
program success. The key issue faced by policy makers is determining 
how to design policies and programs that fit with both worker interests 
and needs and the structure of changing opportunity.
Emerging Policy Issues
In the summer of 1988, the Congress enacted new trade legislation 
designed to strengthen employment and training for displaced workers. 
Among the provisions of this legislation is a new program for displaced 
workers that replaces Title Ilhof JTPA. The new program the Eco 
nomic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (ED- 
WAA) requires that 80 percent of the funds available be allotted, by 
formula, to the states. The remaining 20 percent can be reserved by the 
Secretary of Labor for discretionary purposes.
Of the funds received by the states, up to 40 percent may be set aside 
by the governor for administration, technical assistance, and coordi 
nation, as well as to support statewide, regional, or industrywide 
projects, including rapid-response activities to address unexpected 
plant closings and mass layoffs. The remaining 60 percent is allocated 
to local Service Delivery Areas with a population of at least 200,000, 
according to a formula prescribed by the governor.
With the exception of selected other changes in the governance 
structure of JTPA, the ED WAA program will closely resemble Title III 
of JTPA. While EDWAA does authorize the establishment of a 
voucher system, it continues to provide states, and now SDAs, with 
substantial discretion in selecting programs and services to offer dis-
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placed workers. Skills training, job search assistance, support services, 
and relocation remain among the services authorized under the pro 
gram. EDWAA does, however, increase JTPA©s current 15 percent 
spending limitation on support services to 25 percent, reflecting the 
importance of such services to successful program participation.
In many respects, the EDWAA program represents a new set of 
challenges. After nearly six years of experience under Title III, the 
expectation is that EDWAA will strengthen the nation©s response to 
economic dislocation and worker adjustment. But such improvements 
may be evasive. Despite the experience and knowledge gained under 
Title III, critical issues still remain to be resolved.
Perhaps most important is achieving a better understanding of the 
feasibility of facilitating worker adjustment. This has proved to be a 
more complex undertaking than initially envisioned, largely because of 
the experienced nature of dislocated workers and the pace and nature 
of structural changes in the economy. As such, it is important to place 
the issue of worker adjustment in the context of the changing structure 
of job opportunities in the U.S. These changes have reshaped many of 
the mobility avenues available to workers and have also limited their 
ability to obtain new jobs that offer wages commensurate with their 
skills and experience.
There are several aspects of the mobility process that have an im 
portant bearing on the shape and nature of worker adjustment. Among 
these are the feasibility of moving from declining to growing sectors 
and the implications of such moves for earnings; the type and level of 
training required to facilitate such moves; and the role of short-term 
training in facilitating mobility while minimizing earning loss.
At the same time, however, it may not always be appropriate to 
focus solely on the employment and earnings of the dislocated worker. 
The loss of one©s job will likely influence the labor force participation 
of family members, which, especially in instances of sharp earnings 
loss, can have a favorable influence on overall family income. It is 
thus useful and appropriate to also consider the additional earnings that 
could be generated by a working spouse when considering appropriate 
worker adjustment policies.
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Organization of the Monograph
This monograph is intended to contribute to the formulation of pol 
icies and programs designed to facilitate worker adjustment to eco 
nomic change. We take as our starting point changes in the structure of 
job opportunities in the U.S. and seek to assess their effect on the 
post-layoff adjustment process of displaced workers and policies to 
facilitate it.
Chapter 2 of the monograph focuses on how the structure of job 
opportunities in the U.S. has changed in the recent past, and those 
issues and problems the changes may pose for successful worker ad 
justment. To conduct the analysis, we relied on a uniform series of the 
March Work Experience Supplements to the Current Population Sur 
vey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly survey of a random sample of 
approximately 60,000 households designed to capture basic informa 
tion on employment and unemployment in the U.S. In March of each 
year, a special work experience supplement is administered to obtain 
more detailed data on the employment and earnings experiences of the 
American population. Relative to other data sources, the CPS offers 
two key advantages. First, its size and scope permit detailed analysis 
for the total population as well as subgroups of it. Second, the annual 
administration of the March Supplement provides a basis for conduct 
ing cross-sectional and time series analysis of labor market trends and 
developments. The chief drawback of the CPS, however, is the ab 
sence of longitudinal information on sample members.
The data used in chapter 2 were obtained from a uniform series of 
the March Supplements created under the direction of Professors Rob 
ert Mare and Christopher Winship. Since the scope of the CPS, as well 
as key definitional terms and questions, have changed over time, the 
Mare-Winship data offer a uniform and consistent series of information 
over time. The data included in this analysis focus on wage and salary 
workers aged 16 to 61 employed in private, nonagricultural jobs be 
tween 1970 and 1985.
Chapter 3 assesses the manner in which displaced workers have 
responded to changes in the structure of jobs, and the implications that 
emerge for program policy. Here, we rely on data obtained from the 
January 1986 Dislocated Worker Supplement to the CPS. These sup-
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plemental data were gathered on all household members included in 
the monthly CPS 20-years-old and over who left or lost a job in the 
preceding five years because of a plant closing, a permanent reduction 
in force, layoff without recall, or some similar reason. Those identified 
as displaced were asked a series of questions relating to both their 
layoff jobs and their post-layoff employment and earnings experience. 
All private, nonagricultural wage and salary workers between the ages 
of 20 and 61 were selected for the analysis.
Like the March CPS, the January Supplement contains a nationally 
representative sample sufficient in size to conduct subgroup analysis. 
The January Supplement is also the only available source of data that 
explicitly identifies displaced workers and reports on selected aspects 
of their employment and earnings experience. The chief disadvantage 
of this data set is the lack of longitudinal information on sample mem 
bers.
The final chapter draws together the conclusions from our analyses 
for the purpose of identifying the major challenges faced by programs 
and policies designed to facilitate worker adjustment to economic 
change. It discusses realistic policy goals and their implications for 
program strategy.
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2
Challenges of a 
Changing Labor Market
Over the 16 years ending in 1986, the American economy has pro 
duced unprecedented job growth and opportunities for its citizens. 
Employment among American civilians expanded by over 33 million 
jobs, accommodating the rapid growth of women in the labor force and 
the aspirations of millions in the baby-boom generation. Between 1970 
and 1986, employment growth averaged 2.6 percent per year, repre 
senting an overall growth rate for the period of 43 percent, far in excess 
of the 31 percent experienced during the previous 16 years. And since 
the depths of the 1980-1982 recession, the economy has managed to 
produce an unparalleled period of economic recovery. By June 1988, 
nonagricultural employment was nearly 102 million, higher than at any 
point in the postwar period. Indeed, there is reason to be impressed 
with the American economy and its ability to generate jobs.
Despite record levels of economic expansion, the recent growth of 
job opportunities is not as favorable as it would seem. For one thing, 
the unemployment rate has shown signs of a strong upward secular 
trend that only recently began to fall to levels comparable to the late 
1970s. In 1979, for example, the nation©s unemployment rate stood at 
5.8 percent; it peaked at 9.7 percent in 1982, hovered in the 7 percent 
range for the next four years, and began to drop into the 6 percent 
range in 1987. It was not until the fourth quarter of 1987 that the 
unemployment rate dropped back to its 1979 level. And even though 
the rate fell further to 5.5 percent by the second quarter of 1988, it was 
still higher than in any year between 1948 and 1973. While the econ 
omy may well have produced unprecedented numbers of jobs in recent
13
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Table 2.1 
Percent Distribution of Unemployment by Reason and Duration
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SOURCE: Handbook of Labor Statistics and Employment and Earnings, Bureau of Labor Sta 
tistics, U.S. Department of Labor.
years, it has also generated increasingly higher levels of unemploy 
ment for its workers.
The recent decline in the level of unemployment also masks impor 
tant changes in the composition of unemployment. First, most of the 
rise in unemployment since the late 1970s can be traced to increases in 
the duration of joblessness and the number of job-losers (table 2.1). 
Throughout the 1970s, job-losers represented roughly 43 percent of the 
unemployed. In 1987, five years after the recession, job-losers repre 
sented nearly 49 percent of the unemployed; and even into the second 
quarter of 1988, the proportion of job-losers was still well above the 
1979 average, despite a sharp decline in the nation©s unemployment 
rate.
A similar pattern is evident from the data on unemployment dura 
tions. Between 1970 and 1979, the duration of unemployment in 
creased by 25.6 percent. Over the next eight years, there was a 28.7 
percent increase in the weekly duration of unemployment, a jump from 
10.8 weeks to 13.9 weeks. To put this in another light, nearly 14 
percent of the unemployed reported being jobless for at least 27 weeks 
in 1987. This compares to 8.7 percent in 1979, 7.4 percent in 1974, 
and 5.8 percent in 1970.
One could argue that the increasing duration of unemployment is 
voluntary, in the sense that every unemployed individual could surely 
find a job if he or she really wanted to. It is plausible that rising
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unemployment is due to jobless workers, and especially those losing 
relatively high-wage jobs, choosing to wait for another good job rather 
than take a lower-wage one. While there is certainly a voluntary com 
ponent to all unemployment, it is hard to imagine that most jobless 
individuals prefer not working to working. This is particularly the case 
when one considers those individuals who have contributed most to the 
recent rise in and increasing duration of unemployment.
Between 1979 and 1986, for example, the number of unemployed 
persons in the United States increased by nearly 700,000. Of this total 
increase, 77 percent were married men from intact families. The un 
employment rate among married men with a spouse present rose by 57 
percent between 1979 and 1986, or from 2.8 percent to 4.4 percent; 
and even in the second quarter of 1987, the unemployment rate of these 
individuals stood at 4 percent, higher than at any point throughout the 
entire decade of the 1970s. Moreover, during the same period, married 
men accounted for about 36 percent of the total increase in long-term 
unemployment and experienced a 46 percent rise in their average 
weekly duration of joblessness. It is difficult to believe that most of 
these unemployed workers were in a position to wait very long for 
so-called good jobs.
A more plausible explanation for rising and protracted unemploy 
ment is that it reflects unprecedented shifts in the occupational and 
wage composition of employment opportunities. While changes in the 
structure of job opportunities are not new to the American economy, 
two factors distinguish the post-1979 period. The first is the deep and 
lasting changes brought on by the 1980-1982 recessions (table 2.2). 
Between 1979 and 1985, the sectoral employment shifts were so large 
that they nearly equaled and in some cases surpassed those 
experienced over the entire decade of the 1970s. The result was that 
millions of American workers, who had been holding their own in 
goods-producing and semiskilled jobs, were put out of work at record 
levels. To a large extent, they found themselves faced with 
reemployment opportunities that were increasingly part time and 
concentrated in services, occupations requiring advanced education 
and training, and different regions of the country. To the extent that 
any of these workers were holding high-wage jobs, their problems
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Table 2.2 







_________________1970 1974 1979 1985 change change
I. Private Nonagricultural Employment (in 000s)a
Goods-Producing
Industries 23,578 24,794 26,461 24,681 
-Manufacturing 19,367 20,077 21,040 19,314 
Service-Producing
Industries 34,749 39,301 47,416 58,220
II. Work Experience of Private Wage and Salary Workers 
16-61 (in OOOs Ih
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a. Data cover private nonagricultural establishment employment. Obtained from Employment 
and Earnings, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, January 1987, Table B-1. 
b. Data cover work experience of nonagricultural, private wage and salary employees. Calcu 
lations based on March Supplement to the Current Population Survey.
c. Semiskilled occupations include operatives, assemblers, transportation handlers, and laborers, 
d. Refers to percent of total employment, 
e. The East North Central states include Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
were compounded by significant shifts in the composition of such jobs 
(table 2.3).
During the 1970s, for example, jobs in the highest quartile of the 
full-time wage and salary distribution increasingly emphasized more 
education and training. 1 What was a gradual shift, however, quickly 
became a substantial change. Between 1979 and 1985, goods-pro 
ducing industries lost nearly 16 percent of their high-wage jobs, with 
all of the gain occurring in the service sector. Similarly, the East North 
Central states, which held roughly a quarter of all high-wage employ 
ment throughout the seventies, experienced a 19 percent decline in
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Table 2.3 
Changing Composition of High-Wage Employment8
17
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a. Data refer to workers, aged 16 to 61, employed in the top quartile of the full-time, private, 
nonagricultural wage and salary distribution. Calculations by authors based on the March Sup 
plements to the Current Population Survey, 
b. Semiskilled jobs include operatives, assemblers, transportation handlers, and laborers.
their number of such jobs. And perhaps most important for the workers 
were the human capital shifts. In 1979, 13.3 percent of all high-wage 
jobs were held by those with less than a high school diploma and 20.5 
percent by semiskilled workers. By 1985, these shares dropped to 6.7 
percent and 13.4 percent, respectively. Over 40 percent of high-wage 
jobs were now held by those with at least a college education and the 
skills needed to obtain a variety of professional and executive posi 
tions. Large proportions of newly unemployed high-wage workers 
were simply not prepared to compete for these jobs. 2
The second notable feature distinguishing the post-1979 period is the 
substantial and adverse effect of changes in the structure of job op 
portunities on many visible segments of the population with tradition-
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ally strong attachments to the labor force. Prime-age men, semiskilled 
workers, those with limited education, and those residing in the mid 
west region of the country were disproportionately affected by the 
shifting pattern of employment growth and decline. Their strong at 
tachment to the labor force and stable employment patterns made these 
workers prime targets for the adjustment problems caused by swift 
changes in the structure of job opportunities.
This is reflected in the representation of each group among the 
long-term unemployed and in the lowest quartile of the full-time wage 
and salary distribution (table 2.4). While each group experienced a 
modest reduction in its employment and earnings status during the 
seventies, the status of each group declined after that so precipitously 
that prime-age men, for example, witnessed a 32 percent increase in 
their share of low-wage employment and a 48 percent rise in long-term 
unemployment. While we can say that these workers were losing 
ground for several years, their rate of decline since 1979 had not been 
seen before.
What begins to emerge from this is a pattern of employment growth 
and decline that suggests a strong link between rising and protracted 
unemployment on the one hand, and growing mismatches on the other. 
Many of the workers most affected by the last recession do not appear 
to have the skills needed to obtain growing jobs. Neither do they seem 
to have a very strong likelihood of reemployment in the sectors from 
which they were laid off. In many respects, they are stuck and unable 
to find jobs that offer wages comparable to those of the layoff job. 
While comparable-wage jobs do exist, many of the unemployed tend 
not to be qualified for some, and unable to obtain others due to a 
shrinking number of opportunities. For many, the outcome is lengthy 
unemployment and declining earnings.
It is no wonder, then, that public policy attention has recently 
turned to the question of a vanishing middle class. Since 1979, an 
unprecedented number of adult workers with traditionally strong at 
tachments to the labor force have become unemployed. Unlike 
earlier periods, their unemployment is long term in nature and often 
results in declining earnings. At the center of this seem to be large 
structural changes in the composition of employment, changes which
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Table 2.4 
Changes in the Long-Term Unemployment and Earnings Status 
of Full-Time Wage and Salary Workers8
Year
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a. Data refer to wage and salary workers, aged 16 to 61, employed in private, nonagricultural
jobs. Estimates calculated by authors based on March Supplements to the Current Population
Survey.
b. Refers to workers unemployed for at least 27 weeks.
c. Includes workers in the lowest quartile of the full-time, private, nonagricultural wage and
salary distribution.
d. Semiskilled jobs include operatives, assemblers, transporation handlers, and laborers.
began over 15 years ago but were significantly accelerated by the 
1980-1982 recessions. The U.S. economy may well have generated 
record levels of employment opportunities since that time, but several 
segments of its labor force have been unable to take advantage of 
them.
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Understanding how to improve the labor market©s adjustment pro 
cess is key to present and future employment policy. The magnitude 
and nature of recent economic events suggest that potentially signifi 
cant investments in workers may be needed to facilitate their adjust 
ment to change. But, what form should such investments take? Should 
they be directed toward growing or declining sectors of the economy? 
And how much retraining will be required to limit individual earnings 
losses? These questions are at the center of current policy and require 
careful consideration. The current program landscape developed under 
Title III of JTPA is characterized by short-term training services, lim 
ited financial support, and an overriding concern with placing workers 
in jobs as quickly as possible. This may well be the most practical 
strategy to follow, but it will not necessarily lead to the most desirable 
social or personal outcome. To determine what is an appropriate and 
feasible strategy to follow requires a closer examination of how job 
opportunities have changed and how workers have reacted to the 
change.
In the remainder of this chapter, we examine the changing nature of 
job opportunities in the United States between 1970 and 1985. Our 
objective is to assess three types of changes that have a direct bearing 
on both worker adjustment and policies to facilitate it. These include 
shifts in the human capital attributes, wage distribution, and geo 
graphic location of jobs. The data we rely upon are taken primarily 
from a uniform series of March Supplements to the Current Population 
Survey and presented for private, nonagricultural wage and salary 
workers between the ages of 16 and 61.
Occupational and Educational Upgrading
The growing use of better educated and trained workers has been a 
characteristic of the U.S. economy since the end of the Second World 
War. Even since 1970, substantial improvements have been made to 
the nation©s stock of human capital. Taking education as one measure 
of improvement in human capital, available data show, for example, 
that the fraction of college graduates in the labor force doubled be-
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Table 2.5




































a. Data cover private, nonagricultural wage and salary workers aged 16 to 61. Calculations by 
authors based on March Supplements to the Current Population Survey.
tween 1970 and 1985. Reflecting improvements in the educational 
preparation of the labor force, there has also been a clear and steady 
shift away from semiskilled employment and toward greater use of 
white-collar professional workers. In 1985, professional workers ac 
counted for 22.4 percent of total employment among private, nonag 
ricultural wage and salary workers (table 2.5). This compares to a 
share of 16.4 percent in 1970, and a 30 percent decline in the share of 
employment attributable to semiskilled workers.
The shift toward better educated and trained workers has not been 
confined to certain industry sectors. Occupational and educational up 
grading have been experienced by all sectors of the economy. Goods- 
producing and service industries alike have significantly increased 
their use of highly educated and trained labor (table 2.6). The goods- 
producing sector also increased its use of high school graduates, but 
like the service sector, cut substantially its reliance on semiskilled 
workers. In the goods sector, the share of semiskilled jobs declined 
from 49 percent in 1970 to 37 percent in 1985; similarly, this occu 
pational group dropped from 13.4 percent of service sector employ 
ment to 11 percent.
Over time, steady but gradual shifts toward greater use of better 
educated and trained workers benefit the economy and provide the 
flexibility workers need to adapt to changes in labor demand. If, as has 
been the case since 1979, these shifts are accelerated and substantial, 
they can cause a glut of unemployed workers who are unqualified for 
new, growing jobs and unable to readily obtain reemployment. The
Table 2.6
Education and Occupational Composition of 
Goods- and Service-Producing Industries9
Education
Less than high school 
















































































































a. Data cover private, nonagricultural wage and salary workers aged 16 to 61. Calculations by authors based on March Supplements to the Current 
Population Survey.
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Table 2.7 




























a. Data cover private, nonagricultural wage and salary workers aged 16 to 61. Calculations by 
authors based on March Supplements to the Current Population Survey.
recent record of employment growth and decline suggests that this has 
been the case. Since 1979, a sharp divergence has developed between 
the human capital attributes of growing and declining jobs, contribut 
ing to longer spells of unemployment and a deterioration in the labor 
market standing of experienced semiskilled workers. In some cases, 
the human capital differences are sufficiently large to question the 
feasibility of worker displacement policy that is targeted on growth 
sectors of the economy.
To provide some perspective on the issue, consider first the recent 
contribution of professional and sales jobs to total employment growth 
(table 2.7). Between 1979 and 1985, almost half of all new jobs 
created by the economy were professional, and an additional 30 per 
cent were in the sales field. These rates of contribution to employment 
growth were at least double those of earlier periods, and far greater 
than those of blue-collar jobs.
Just as these occupations were increasing their share of total em 
ployment, they were also making more use of college educated labor 
(table 2.8). 3 In fact, there were large increases in the share of college 
graduates in all occupational categories. Professional workers, how 
ever, led the way, with over 50 percent having at least a college 
diploma in 1985, compared to 40.5 percent in 1979 and 35.1 percent 
in 1970. While only 20 percent of sales jobs employed college grad 
uates in 1985, this was nearly double the share in 1970. Moreover, 
only 13 percent of sales workers do not have a high school diploma, 
down from 25.5 percent in 1970 and well below the 1985 national 
average of 19.1 percent.
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Table 2.8
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a. Data cover private, nonagricultural wage and salary workers aged 16 to 61. Calculations by 
authors based on March Supplements to the Current Population Survey.
In contrast to the strong growth of professional and sales occupa 
tions, blue-collar jobs and especially semiskilled jobs contributed neg 
atively to employment growth between 1979 and 1985. As discussed 
earlier, the absolute decline in employment among semiskilled work 
ers between 1979 and 1985 exceeded the total level of employment 
growth for the group in the previous nine-year period. Since relatively 
few semiskilled workers had completed college or professional train 
ing, unemployment presented the difficult task of finding new job 
opportunities in a labor market using more high-level human resources 
than at any time in the past 16 years.
Over the same period, however, the economy also generated jobs 
that require limited skills and training. In the growing service- 
producing sector, for example, nearly 40 percent of all jobs remain in 
clerical and service occupations, despite this sector©s equally heavy 
reliance on high-level human resources. And even though service 
occupations increased their share of college graduates, 34 percent of 
service workers still had less than a high school education, nearly 
double the national average (see tables 2.6 and 2.8). While not 
necessarily matched to the experience or interests of job seekers, these 
jobs do represent reemployment opportunities.
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These jobs may also represent the risk of occupational downgrading. 
Experienced blue-collar workers, in particular, do not qualify for the 
large number of growing white-collar, professional jobs, and are over- 
qualified for many other growth sector jobs. Absent retraining and 
educational upgrading, many will be faced with longer-term unem 
ployment and declining earnings.
To examine these adjustment issues more directly, we first com 
pared the education and training of long-term unemployed workers 
with those of workers employed in growth and nongrowth sectors 
of the economy. We selected the long-term unemployed because they 
account for a growing share of the unemployed and because they 
represent a reasonable proxy for workers targeted under Title III 
of JTPA and included in several recent Department of Labor dem 
onstration projects. In these comparisons, we used broad criteria 
to define the growth sector a two-digit industry was defined as grow 
ing if it had a growth rate at or above the national average between 
1979 and 1986. 4 If the unemployed are indeed faced with skill mis 
matches, the data should reveal large gaps between the human capital 
attributes of the long-term unemployed and those working in growth 
sectors.
The results of the comparison highlight two important points (table 
2.9). The first is to confirm the sharp divergence between growing and 
nongrowing industries. It is evident that new job opportunities place a 
disproportionate emphasis on young workers, those with more educa 
tion, and jobs in the sales, administrative support, and service fields. 
Growth sector jobs also employ relatively small shares of prime-age 
men, semiskilled, and skilled blue-collar workers, groups most af 
fected by recent changes in the structure of job opportunities.
The second point is that, on at least a broad level, the long-term 
unemployed are not well positioned to compete for jobs in growth 
sectors. While comparable shares of both groups had high school 
educations, nearly 19 percent of growth sector employees possessed a 
college degree, in contrast to 5.7 percent of the long-term unemployed. 
In fact, in 1985 fully one-third of the long-term unemployed had 
completed less than high school, more than double the share for growth 
sector employees.
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Table 2.9
Education, Age, and Occupational Composition by Industry and 
____________Unemployment Status, 1985a_____________
Growth Other Long-term All 
industries©1 industries unemployed0 unemployed
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a. Data cover private, nonagricultural wage and salary workers aged 16 to 61. Calculations by
authors based on March Supplements to the Current Population Survey.
b. See appendix 2-A for a definition of growth sectors.
c. Includes workers with 27 or more weeks of unemployment.
A similar scenario emerges on an occupational basis. Just over 23 
percent of all growth sector employees held professional jobs in com 
parison to 6.4 percent for the long-term unemployed. The single larg 
est occupational group among the long-term unemployed was semi 
skilled positions (36.6 percent). This occupational category accounted 
for only 11.7 percent of growth sector employment.
If less educated, lower skilled workers are experiencing adjustment 
difficulties, we would also expect to observe declines in their earnings 
and increases in their durations of unemployment. Earlier in this chap 
ter, we examined this for semiskilled workers and found such results. 
We also calculated results for those with less than a high school di 
ploma and those with at least a college degree (table 2.10). Take
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unemployment first. In 1970, 14.7 percent of all unemployed workers 
without a high school diploma were jobless for at least 27 weeks. This 
increased to 17.3 percent in 1979 while in 1985 it rose to 23.7 percent, 
representing a 61 percent increase over the 15-year period. In contrast, 
over the same period long-term unemployment among college gradu 
ates increased by only 1.6 percentage points, from 11.3 percent to 12.9 
percent.
A similar pattern emerges with respect to real earnings. Using 1985 
dollars, the real earnings of full-time workers with at least a college 
degree declined modestly between 1970 and 1985, from $33,472 to 
$31,472. In contrast, full-time workers with less than 12 years of 
education experienced a real earnings decline of nearly 16 percent; 
their average, inflation-adjusted earnings dropped from $15,616 in 
1970 to $13,124 in 1985.
To place this in another light, consider the representation of each 
group in the lowest quartile of the full-time, private, nonagricultural 
wage and salary distribution. 5 As expected, the share of less educated 
workers in the lowest wage and salary quartile increased from 31.8 
percent in 1970 to 43.1 percent in 1985, with most of the increase 
occurring after 1979. For those with at least a college degree, there was 
actually movement out of the lowest quartile.
These results have two important policy implications. First, they 
indicate that the human capital distribution of job opportunities has 
become more polarized over time. There has been a large-scale re 
placement of semiskilled, goods-producing, jobs with professional and 
sales opportunities requiring relatively high levels of education. To a 
lesser extent, there has also been a visible shift toward lower level jobs 
as well. These changes are evident in all industry groups, and espe 
cially in the growing service sector. The general outlook for intersector 
mobility is, at best, difficult. For many workers, the outcome of these 
changes has been increases in unemployment and declines in real 
earnings.
Second, the data also suggest significant skills mismatches between 
the long-term unemployed and growth sectors of the economy. On 
average, growth industries do not have many jobs that appear to rely
Table 2.10 
Unemployment and Earnings Status by Selected Educational Levels8
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a. Data cover private, nonagricultural wage and salary workers aged 16 to 61. Calculations by authors based on March Supplements to the Current 
Population Survey.
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on the skills and education of long-term unemployed workers. While 
there are indeed some jobs like this, they represent a proportionately 
small share of all growth sector jobs. For many of the long-term 
unemployed, a return to slow growing or declining industries may 
represent the best avenue to obtain jobs that require their skills. But 
obtaining a job in this sector can, almost by definition, be quite time 
consuming and risky. Unless workers are willing to wait for such jobs 
to develop, they will be faced with having to choose between making 
an investment in retraining and education or accepting a lower-wage 
job. Since most workers would prefer not to accept a drop in earnings, 
it is critical to identify the importance and feasibility of their obtaining 
a comparable-wage job.
The Changing Structure of Wage Opportunities
Maintaining comparable earnings can be important for several rea 
sons. Perhaps most important is that earnings loss can have harmful 
and lasting effects on individuals and their families. The literature on 
plant closings and worker displacement is replete with evidence show 
ing the economic and personal hardships of sudden and sustained 
earnings declines. These considerations alone suggest the desirability 
of federal policies that facilitate reemployment at comparable wages.
Policy should also be based on an assessment of whether earnings 
loss represents a problem of economic efficiency, however. It could be 
that displaced workers have been selectively laid off because they are 
less productive than other workers with similar skills and abilities. If 
this is the case, then much of their observed earnings decline can be 
viewed as a market-wage adjustment, not an efficiency problem. Sim 
ilarly, the existence of interindustry wage differences for equally 
skilled workers, or economic rents, can also be used to explain earn 
ings declines. Efficiency wage theories, as they are called, view such 
differentials as efficient, insofar as they represent differences in indus 
try-specific decisions regarding profit maximization. 6 Since most in 
dustries paying relatively high wages are in the goods-producing sec 
tor, and because this sector has accounted for a disproportionate share 
of displaced workers, earnings loss can also be seen as the result of
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moving from a high- to a low-rent industry. While such a result will 
adversely affect a worker, it will not necessarily represent an ineffi 
cient allocation of workers. Workers will have become reemployed in 
industries that offer wages commensurate with their skills and abilities.
Under either scenario, the case for reemployment at comparable 
wages is weakened. Since the outcome of the reemployment process is 
viewed as efficient, limited economic benefits can be derived by help 
ing workers fully recoup their earnings loss. From a policy perspective 
then, the question becomes whether, on the basis of equity consider 
ations, society should bear the cost of helping workers make up what 
were otherwise economic rents.
While economic rents may explain some of the earnings loss expe 
rienced by displaced workers, there is reason to believe that they are 
insufficient in size to account for the majority of the loss. For one 
thing, selective layoff is most plausible for white-collar workers. High 
rates of unionization and the prevalence of seniority rules among blue- 
collar workers protect them from complete employer discretion during 
a layoff. In addition, not all displaced workers lose jobs from high-rent 
industries. Over 30 percent of workers losing their jobs between 1981 
and 1986 were displaced from the service sector, and another 8 percent 
from the transportation, utilities, and communication industries; each 
of these industry groups and especially the service sector have been 
shown to pay wages that are lower than those offered in all other 
industries, after controlling for differences in human capital and per 
sonal characteristics. 7 Even among blue-collar workers, whose wages 
have historically been boosted by union membership, only 30 percent 
actually belong to a union. And in the manufacturing sector, roughly 
55 percent of blue-collar workers do not belong to a union. 8 It is thus 
difficult to argue that the majority of a displaced worker©s earnings loss 
is attributable to market-wage adjustments or the loss of economic 
rents. 9
In light of this, one way to assess the importance of comparable- 
wage employment is by comparing the reemployment earnings of dis 
placed workers with those of other similar workers. If the displaced 
become reemployed at earnings levels below those of other workers 
with like skills and abilities, and if these differences persist over time,
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then a reasonable case can be made for federal policies that emphasize 
reemployment at comparable wages. Indeed, several studies have 
shown that displacement leads to earnings loss; however, data limita 
tions and the infrequent use of comparison groups make their findings 
inconclusive. This is especially so regarding the duration of earnings 
decline. Some studies have estimated that up to 50 percent of observed 
earnings losses are eliminated within two years, while others have 
shown that such declines persist over time. 10
To address these issues, we relied on earnings information from a 
nationally representative sample of adult workers included in the Jan 
uary 1986 Current Population Survey. Since this sample also identifies 
workers who were permanently dislocated from their jobs between 
1981 and 1986, it can be used to determine how the reemployment 
earnings of displaced workers compare with those of other workers 
with similar characteristics. The data can also be used to observe the 
time pattern of earnings loss and how earnings loss may vary among 
subgroups of the population.
To assess the effect of dislocation on earnings, we estimated a 
regression model for all employed men between the ages of 20 and 61 
using the log of January 1986 weekly earnings as the dependent vari 
able, and a standard set of demographic characteristics, along with 
education, occupation, and industry variables, as controls. 11 Alterna 
tive versions of a dummy variable reflecting one©s displacement status 
were used to directly observe the effect of displacement. These vari 
ables were designed to identify the average percentage effect of dis 
location on earnings, its pattern over time, and any differences be 
tween blue- and white-collar workers, and those affected by plant 
closings and other types of layoff. This basic model was estimated 
separately using three sample specifications to determine the sensitiv 
ity of the findings.
Because of data limitations, the model could be estimated accurately 
only for all workers. Regional models were prohibited by insufficient 
sample size, while separate modelling for blue- and white-collar work 
ers was limited by problems in matching up the comparison group. For 
example, since the nondisplaced do not have a layoff job, they can 
only be matched with displaced workers in one of two ways; on the
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basis of their current occupation, or on the basis of each group©s 
current occupation. In the first case, the estimated effect of displace 
ment on earnings will likely be biased downward as a result of having 
to assume that occupational requirements remained stable between the 
year of layoff and January 1986. Over a short period of time, this 
assumption would be reasonable; however, since large proportions of 
the displaced lost their jobs as far back as 1981 and 1982, making such 
an assumption is tenuous given the occupational and educational up 
grading discussed earlier in the chapter.
In the second case, underestimates of the effects of displacement are 
also likely since the majority of displaced workers do not experience 
interoccupational mobility, a major cause of earnings loss. As a result, 
selecting on the basis of current occupation would produce a sample of 
dislocated workers who became reemployed largely in the same field 
from which they were laid off. Thus, the results presented here below 
pertain only to the average worker. Questions relating to the time 
pattern of earnings effects by subgroup and region will have to await 
the availability of additional data.
Overall, our results show that when displaced workers become re- 
employed, they do earn less than other workers with similar charac 
teristics (table 2.11). Depending on the sample used, the earnings 
difference ranges from 15 to 20 percent, and holds even after control 
ling for differences in hours worked; the mean hourly wage effect of 
displacement is nearly identical to the total earnings effect, suggesting 
that the relatively low earnings of the displaced is not the result of 
working less.
The results also reveal three other important findings. First, white- 
as well as blue-collar workers appear to earn less than others with 
similar characteristics, although the impact for blue-collar workers 
tends, as expected, to be slightly greater. 12 Second, the results show 
that regardless of why a worker was laid off, earnings differences 
remain large and statistically significant. Those affected by plant clos 
ings as well as other types of layoff both earn significantly less than 
other workers with similar characteristics. One interpretation of this is 
that the selective layoff view of earnings loss can, at best, be only 
partially correct. Since employers cannot readily exercise discretion
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over who to layoff during a plant shutdown, and because plant closings 
accounted for well over half of all layoffs, the relatively low earnings 
of the displaced cannot be wholly attributed to selective layoff on the 
basis of poor productivity or performance. 13 This is consistent with our 
earlier discussion of selective layoffs and helps to better explain the 
economic consequences of earnings loss.
An alternative view is that the relatively large effect of plant clos 
ings on earnings loss reflects the elimination of recall opportunities 
and a greater willingness on the part of displaced workers to accept a 
drop in their earnings. This is not inconsistent with the above inter 
pretation, and only serves to further highlight the importance and 
difficulty of obtaining comparable wage jobs.
Third, the findings by year of layoff suggest that earnings loss does 
diminish over time; losses are greatest for those laid off in 1985 and 
least for those who lost a job in 1981. However, it appears that it may
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still take up to two years to recoup 50 percent of the loss. While this 
suggests that earnings loss is partly transitory, it should not be viewed 
too optimistically. Five years of substantially lower earnings repre 
sents a sizeable and sustained loss to individuals and their families. 
Moreover, although this pattern may also reflect the effects of the 1980 
to 1982 recessions on postlayoff recovery, the results for 1984 alone 
suggest that a large loss may still persist for at least two years. On the 
basis of these results, a case can be made to support federal policies 
that facilitate reemployment at comparable wages.
Given these findings, what can be said about the feasibility of ob 
taining a comparable-wage job? Part of the answer lies in how the 
distribution of wages and salaries has changed. If, as many argue, 
employment opportunities have become increasingly low-wage, then 
maintaining a mid-level or high-earnings job will be relatively difficult 
regardless of one©s human capital. 14 Human capital can also come into 
play if the jobs that constitute the wage distribution have changed. If 
the human capital upgrading we observed earlier has affected the com 
position of jobs in the wage distribution, then maintaining one©s earn 
ings will also be dependent on the extent of skill mismatches and the 
feasibility of overcoming them.
To assess the changing distribution of job opportunities, we divided 
the annual wage and salary income of workers into quartiles, using the 
1970 distribution as the base. 15 All dollars were then expressed in 1985 
values, and used to examine two aspects of the changing structure of 
wage opportunities, including the distribution itself, and the contribu 
tion of employment in each wage and salary quartile to total employ 
ment change between 1970 and 1974, 1974 and 1979, and 1979 and 
1985. To assess the effect of growing part-time employment on the 
distribution, we also computed estimates for full-time and all workers, 
separately. The earnings cut-offs for both groups of workers are pre 
sented below.
Considering the wage and salary distribution first, our findings show 
overall stability with a slight rise at the tails (table 2.12). On average, 
it does not appear that among working age, private, nonagricultural 
workers, there has been a sharp downward shift in the distribution of 
wages and salaries. Among all workers, the data indicate a slight rise
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Annual Earnings Quartiles for Full-Time and All Workers 
______________________(1985 dollars)______________________
______Full-time workers______ ________All workers________
Low- High- Low- High- 
Lowest middle middle Highest Lowest middle middle Highest 
_____quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile
Earnings <$9,735 $9,735- $16,001- >$26,000 <$5,510 $5,510- $13,000- >$23,200 
Range $16,000 $26,000 $13,000 $23,200
in the proportion employed in the lower and upper tails of the distri 
bution, with a small decline in the middle. This is likely due to the 
increasing share of part-time employment, since the distribution for 
just full-time workers exhibited a small upward trend between 1970 
and 1985.
Changes in the distribution of wages and salaries is only a crude 
indicator of the direction that employment is taking. A more informa 
tive indicator is the contribution of employment in each quartile of the 
distribution to total employment change. This measure provides a 
clearer indication of how jobs are changing and the direction that the 
total distribution may take.
Estimates of this measure show that the shifting pattern of employ 
ment growth and decline has placed a disproportionate emphasis on the 
growth of low- and high-wage jobs. Opportunities in the middle of the 
distribution appear to be a smaller part of the large number of jobs that 
have grown in recent years. Between 1979 and 1985, the contribution 
of jobs in the middle of the distribution declined relative to the previ 
ous period©s rapid expansion. At the same time, employment growth at 
the tails of the distribution accelerated. While the overall distribution 
of wages and salaries may not have changed substantially, it is clear 
that since 1979 there has been a growing emphasis placed on low- and 
high-wage work at the expense of jobs in the middle.
This pattern of changing wage opportunities is consistent with the 
pattern of industry growth and decline. For the past 16 years, and 
especially since 1979, the economy has increasingly emphasized in 
dustries paying relatively low-wages (table 2.13). This is evident from 
earnings comparisons between industries defined as growing and those 
experiencing below-average growth rates between 1979 and 1986. In
Table 2.12
Wage and Salary Distribution of Private, Nonagricultural Workers, 
Aged 16 to 61, by wage quartile3
All 












































































a. Calculations by authors based on March Supplements to the Current Population Survey. § 
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Table 2.13
Comparisons of Earnings Between Growing and Nongrowing 
______________Industries (1985)"________________
























a. Data cover private, nonagricultural wage and salary workers aged 16 to 61. Calculations by 
authors based on March Supplements to the Current Population Survey, 
b. See appendix 2-A for a description of growth industries.
1985, for example, the mean earnings of full-time wage and salary 
workers employed in the growth sector was $18,919, compared to 
$21,742 for those working in nongrowth sectors. Moreover, 27.4 per 
cent of workers in growth industries were employed in the lowest 
quartile of the wage and salary distribution in contrast to 20.6 percent 
of employees in nongrowing industries. 16
Similar differences are evident when comparing the goods- 
producing sector and the rapidly expanding service sector (table 2.14). 
Two important points emerge here. The first is that service industries 
historically have had a disproportionate concentration of employment 
in the low end of the distribution, although their relative earnings 
position has improved somewhat over time. For example, roughly 30 
percent of employment in goods production has been in the highest 
quartile of the wage distribution, in comparison to no more than 23 
percent of service sector employment. Since service-producing indus 
tries have accounted for most of the increase in employment after 
1979, it follows that job generation would emphasize lower-wage em 
ployment.
The second point is that the declining share of jobs in the middle of 
the distribution appears attributable to a slowdown in both goods pro 
duction and service employment. While the large drop in goods-pro-
Table 2.14
Distribution of Employment Shares by Wage Quartile and 
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ducing employment since 1979 was concentrated in the upper end of 
the distribution, the growth of middle-wage jobs dropped significantly. 
Moreover, employment growth in the service sector was driven largely 
by an expansion in the contribution of low- and high-wage work; the 
net contribution of jobs in the middle of the distribution also declined 
relative to other periods.
The downward trend in the wage distribution of growing jobs helps 
to explain why so many workers affected by recent economic changes 
have experienced earnings declines. The rapid growth of jobs at both 
ends of the wage distribution has left many unemployed semiskilled 
and prime-age male workers with new opportunities that require a 
move either up or down the earnings ladder. Since these workers do 
not qualify readily for high-wage jobs, and because the growth of 
mid-level jobs has declined, their most likely source of new opportu 
nities lies in the low-wage sector. 17
The wage and salary distribution of prime-age men, semiskilled 
workers, and the less educated confirm this (table 2.15). Throughout 
the 1970s, these groups experienced a steady decline in their earnings; 
after 1979, however, the decline was substantially accelerated. Re 
flecting changes in the composition of employment, women, profes 
sional workers, and the better educated were able to move up the 
earnings ladder.
But the problem faced by workers most affected by recent economic 
changes is not just one of a growing polarization in the wage distri 
bution of new employment opportunities. Large changes have also 
occurred in the composition of employment within each wage and 
salary quartile. Overall, we find a substantial degree of occupational 
and educational upgrading within the wage and salary distribution 
(table 2.16).
In each wage quartile, there has been a steady increase in the rep 
resentation of better educated and trained workers. This is especially 
evident at the higher ends of the distribution where prime-age men and 
semiskilled workers have lost ground. There is also a consistent de 
cline in the representation of employment in goods production, also 
particularly evident in the upper end of the distribution. Even in the 
low-middle quartile, we see the increasing emphasis placed on service
Table 2.15












































































































































Education, Industry, and Occupational Distribution by Wage and 
Salary Quartile, All Wage and Salary Workers3
Low-middle quartile
Education
Less than high school diploma
High school diploma
Some college
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a. Data cover private, nonagricultural wage and salary workers aged 16 to 61. Calculations by authors based on March Supplements to the Current 
Population Survey.
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employment and jobs that require more education and occupational 
preparation. As workers in each quartile lose their jobs, obtaining 
comparable wages will depend on how prepared they are to meet 
greater educational and skill requirements.
If workers cannot obtain comparable-wage jobs within their old 
industries, it is clear that they will be faced with two interrelated 
problems. The first is the growth in the contribution of low-wage 
employment to total job expansion. The changing structure of wage 
opportunities is such that reemployment in a growth sector will in 
crease the likelihood of an earnings decline. The second problem will 
be the need to overcome educational and possibly occupational training 
deficiencies in response to upgrading within each quartile of the wage 
and salary distribution. As one moves up the distribution, these defi 
ciencies appear to increase in magnitude, suggesting that relatively 
large investments in training and education would have to be made in 
those workers losing high-wage jobs.
Changing Regional Employment Opportunities
Although national trends in the structure of job opportunities influ 
ence worker adjustment patterns, it is ultimately at the regional level 
where such adjustments take place. If the rate and nature of economic 
change were uniformly distributed among regions, then one would not 
expect to observe large variations in regional adjustment. However, as 
has been well documented, strong differences in economic growth 
have developed in recent years, especially since 1979 (table 2.17). 
These differences have contributed to an uneven pattern of regional 
adjustment to change. For the most part, those regions experiencing 
sluggish growth have also experienced relatively high rates and long 
durations of unemployment.
Differences in regional adjustment patterns have also been influ 
enced by sharp variations in the changing structure of job opportuni 
ties. The changing nature of human capital requirements and wage 
opportunities has been much more pronounced in some regions than 
others, exacerbating the adjustment problems faced by workers.
This is illustrated with information on the nature of changing job
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a. Data cover private, nonagricultural wage and salary workers aged 16 to 61. Calculations by 
authors based on March Supplements to the Current Population Survey.
opportunities in regions with similar types of employment declines, but 
vastly different unemployment rates the East North Central states 
and the Mid-Atlantic states (table 2.18). 18 These two regions experi 
enced significant declines in their shares of goods-producing jobs, and 
particularly manufacturing jobs. Moreover, both regions also under 
went sharp decreases in semiskilled jobs and occupations. On the 
surface, these results would appear to be at odds with the fact that 
unemployment in 1986 was much higher in the East North Central 
states than it was in the Mid-Atlantic states. But a closer look at 
variations in the contribution to changing job opportunities provides a 
somewhat clearer picture and helps to clarify why the two regions have 
had different patterns of adjustment.
In the Mid-Atlantic states, the changing nature of job opportunities 
was much more evenly distributed than in the East North Central 
states. While the direction of change was the same in both regions, the 
Mid-Atlantic states did not experience such a substantial upheaval in 
the nature of available job opportunities. As a result, it is quite feasible 
that reemployment opportunities in this region were not nearly as 
constrained (or polarized) as in the East North Central states, providing 
workers with substantially more flexibility and choice.
As an example, consider the occupational and educational changes
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Table 2.18
Changing Job Opportunities in the East North Central and 
Mid-Atlantic States87"
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a. Data refer to workers aged 16 to 61 employed in private, nonagricultural wage and salary 
distribution. Calculations are based on the March Supplements to the Current Population Survey, 
b. The states comprising these two regions include: 1. East North Central Ohio, Indiana, 
Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin; 2. Mid-Atlantic New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
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in employment. In the East North Central region, nearly all net new 
employment was in professional jobs and for individuals with at least 
a college degree. In fact, the decline in semiskilled work and employ 
ment among the least educated was just about equal to the total level 
of employment expansion. For these workers, reemployment oppor 
tunities are constrained not only by an insufficient demand, but also by 
the nature of new opportunities.
While a similar pattern is evident in the Mid-Atlantic region, it is not 
nearly as pronounced. The (negative) contribution of all blue-collar 
employment in the Mid-Atlantic region was only half that of the East 
North Central region, as was the decline in employment among the 
least educated. And although professional employment accounted for 
a disproportionately large share of total growth, it was also much less 
than in the East North Central region. Thus, while workers in the 
Mid-Atlantic states faced a tough road to reemployment, it appears to 
have been a smoother one to travel. As a result, one would expect labor 
market adjustment to be more efficient.
This example illustrates how regional variations in the structure of 
job opportunities can influence worker adjustment to change. At the 
same time, there have also been large differences in the structure of 
wage opportunities on a regional basis. The trend toward lower-wage 
work has been particularly evident in the Midwest region. In the East 
North Central states, for example, 85 percent of net new employment 
between 1979 and 1985 was attributable to jobs in the lowest quartile 
of the wage and salary distribution. Jobs in the second lowest quartile 
contributed another 43 percent, while the highest paying jobs regis 
tered a net loss of just over 53 percent. Following the example pre 
sented above, jobs at the bottom and top of the wage and salary 
distribution accounted for roughly 23 percent of net employment 
growth in the Mid-Atlantic states, respectively.
The large growth of low-wage jobs in the East North Central states 
may seem at odds with the rapid growth of employment among college 
educated, professional workers in that region. However, upon closer 
inspection, two explanations emerge. First, sales jobs, which repre 
sented 71 percent of all new jobs in the East North Central states have 
a disproportionately large share of part-time employment. In 1985, for
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example, 31.3 percent of all sales jobs held in the U.S. were part time, 
compared to 20 percent of total employment. Second, the largest 
source of job loss in the East North Central states was in the goods- 
producing sector. This sector, which lost many high-wage jobs, was 
and remains the dominant industry in the region.
For workers residing in the Midwest, the problem of readjustment 
can thus be viewed as structural. Sharp changes in the structure of job 
and wage opportunities have contributed to substantial readjustment 
difficulties. Given the strong shift toward professional and lower-wage 
employment, workers are indeed faced with a pressing dilemma. Al 
though reemployment in declining sectors may represent the most 
viable means to obtain a comparable-wage job, their declining num 
bers can make such a move quite difficult. And while new jobs are 
growing, they appear to represent a move down the earnings ladder, 
unless substantial investments in training and education are made. For 
the unemployed displaced worker, choosing an appropriate road to 
recovery can indeed be viewed as a formidable task.
While these results are similar to our national findings, they also 
show how important regional economic conditions are to successful 
worker adjustment. Some regions, like the Midwest, offer limited 
alternatives to long-term unemployment, declining earnings, and the 
prospect of de-skilling. The rate and nature of economic change is so 
great that workers (and programs to aid them) have no choice but to 
pursue reemployment alone, almost regardless of wages and skill 
matching. In other regions where economic change has not been as 
swift, workers have more flexibility and choice in selecting a reem 
ployment strategy. Programs and policies in these regions might 
rightly look quite different from those in more hard-hit areas of the 
country.
To obtain a better understanding of appropriate policy responses to 
recent economic changes, we turn in the next chapter to an examina 
tion of how displaced workers have responded to the challenge of a 
changing labor market. Our objective is to determine more clearly the 
extent and nature of potential skill mismatches and the feasibility of 
policies that pursue as their goal reemployment in comparable-wage 
jobs.
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NOTES
1. To be counted in this quartile, an individual had to have annual earnings of at least $26,000, 
expressed in 1985 dollars.
2. A similar result emerged for jobs in the second and third quartile of the wage and salary 
distribution, or among what might be referred to as middle-class jobs. Between 1979 and 1985, 
these jobs also experienced large shifts in their distribution across educational levels, industries, 
and occupations. This is discussed more fully later in this chapter.
3. A portion of the shift toward better educated workers reflects the aging of the population, as 
older, less educated workers retire, and new young college graduates increase their share of total 
employment. This does not, however, change the implications for worker adjustment. The same 
general point holds for the findings in table 2.9.
4. See appendix 2-A for a description of how the growth sector was defined.
5. Setting the distribution in 1970 and adjusting wages to 1985 values, the upper end of the 
low-wage quartile is $9,735. See pages 34 and 35 for a more detailed discussion of the wage and 
salary distribution.
6. See: Alan Krueger and Lawrence Summers, "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage 
Structure," Econometrica 56, 2(March, 1988).
7. See: Krueger and Summers, "Efficiency Wages," pages 281-287 for estimates of wage 
differentials by three-digit industry.
8. See: Richard Freeman and James Medoff, What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books, 
1984.
9. A recent study empirically evaluated these issues and found evidence indicating that the loss 
of economic rents represents only a small portion of the earnings decline experienced by dis 
placed workers. In addition, the same study found that the case for selective layoff is indeed 
primarily applicable to white-collar workers. While the earnings of blue-collar workers prior to 
layoff were comparable to those of other workers, predisplacement earnings for white-collar and 
service workers were lower than those of other similar workers, but not nearly as low as earnings 
observed on the reemployment job. See: Adam Seitchik, "Labor Displacement in the New 
Family Economy," Ph.D. diss., Boston University, Boston, MA, August 1988. 
10. See: Louis S. Jacobson, "A Tale of Employment Decline in Two Cities: How Bad Was the 
Worst of Times?" Industrial and Labor Relations Review 37, 4 (July 1984); Louis S. Jacobson, 
"Earnings Losses of Workers Displaced from Manufacturing Industries," in The Impact of 
International Trade and Investment on Employment, Washington, DC: GPO, pp. 87-98, William 
G. Dewald, ed., 1978; Michael Podgursky and Paul Swaim, "Job Displacement and Earnings 
Loss: Evidence From the Displaced Worker Survey," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 41, 
1 (October 1987); Christopher J. Ruhm, "The Economic Consequences of Labor Mobility," 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 41,1 (October 1987).
11. While it would have been preferable to also control for tenure and layoff earnings, these data 
were not available for the nondisplaced group of workers. The regular monthly CPS does not 
collect tenure information and captures data only for the particular survey month.
12. As discussed earlier, some of the earnings loss experienced by white-collar workers is likely 
due to selective layoff and reflective of a market-wage adjustment.
13. It is possible, however, for employers to redeploy "the best workers" to other plants within 
the corporate structure. While this is certainly feasible, it would have to account for the majority 
of reported plant closings to be consistent with the selective layoff argument. In addition, it is also 
possible that observed effects of mass layoffs and other types of reductions in force reflect
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selective layoff since in these instances employers do have discretion over how to layoff. How 
ever, judgment of this is critically dependent on whether the predisplacement earnings of those 
workers.was lower than those of other similar employees, holding other factors constant. As 
discussed earlier, such a result was found only for white-collar workers, and even in this case, 
the predisplacement earnings differences were much smaller than those observed during the 
postlayoff period. Moreover, holding other factors constant, the selective layoff interpretation 
would predict little, if any, earnings differences between the current earnings of displaced and 
other similar workers. As shown in table 2.12, just the opposite is observed.
14. For a critical review of recent research on the changing pattern of wage opportunities see: 
Gary W. Loveman and Chris Tilly, "Good Jobs or Bad Jobs: What Does the Evidence Say?" 
New England Economic Review (January, February, 1988).
15. We chose to rely on quartiles rather than the more familiar thirds to avoid having to 
arbitrarily select earnings cut-offs and to be able to better examine the distribution. This choice, 
combined with restricting the analysis to only private, nonagricultural workers between the ages 
of 16 and 61, should be expected to produce results different from those focused on all wage and 
salary workers and using thirds to examine the distribution of wages and salaries.
16. An alternative explanation of these earnings differences is that they reflect differences in the 
position of each sector©s workers on the age-earnings profile. Since growing industries, such as 
services, employ younger and less experienced workers than declining or slow-growing indus 
tries, one would expect lower average earnings. We tested for this and found that, after control 
ling for age, human capital, and other personal characteristics, the service sector pays anywhere 
between 24 and 36 percent less than any other industry sector. See table 2B in the appendix for 
the results.
17. This also helps to explain why these worker groups have experienced a decline in their share 
of high wage jobs despite an overall rise in the share of such jobs nationally.
18. The East North Central includes Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The 
Mid-Atlantic includes New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.




Definition of Industry Growth Sector
Employment and Earnings reports annual employment levels by 
detailed industry. From these we are able to calculate secular industry 
growth rates from the peak year 1979 through the latest year available, 
1986. There were only moderate changes in the Standard Industrial 
Classification system between 1970 and 1980, and we have been able 
to adjust for most of these in calculating growth from 1979 to 1986.© 
In table 2A-1, growth rates are shown for the 39 two-digit SIC indus 
tries, using the 1980 SIC categories.
As shown in table 2A-1, civilian employment grew by 13.1 percent 
between 1979 and 1986. Industry growth rates were quite varied. In 
general, manufacturing and agricultural industries were in decline, 
while almost all other industries grew: construction, transport, com 
munications, utilities, trade, finance, insurance, real estate, and ser 
vice (other than private household service).
The simplest way to categorize growth sectors of the economy 
would be to include all expanding industries, or those wherein em 
ployment is growing faster than for the nation as a whole. Listing out 
the sectors experiencing growth, beginning with the fastest growing, 
we observe the following:
At first glance, there appear to be at least 18 growth industries, 
wherein employment expanded at a rate in excess of that for the nation. 
However, "Transportation equipment" is a puzzling case, since the 
popular conception is that employment in automobile production has 
declined since its peak in 1979. In fact, the detailed industrial employ 
ment figures do show a stagnation in "motor vehicles and motor 
vehicle equipment," a subset of "Transportation equipment." The 
"Transportation equipment" sector has grown mostly through the in 
clusion of a new detailed category, "guided missiles, space vehicles,
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and parts," which was in all likelihood combined with "miscellaneous 
manufacturing" under the old SIC categories used in 1979. Therefore, 
the additional employment reported in "Transportation equipment 
(manufacturing)" for 1986 is essentially a statistical artifact; we should 
not include this as one of our high-growth categories.
Notice that there are three industries in which there was net em 
ployment growth 1979-86, but where expansion was at a rate below 
the average for the nation. Among these three, the fastest-growing was 
"Utilities and sanitary services." All five detailed industries within 
this 2-digit category expanded by at least 5 percent, creating an overall 
average of almost 10 percent employment growth. In comparison, the 
next industry down on the list, "Transportation," expanded by only 5 
percent. 2 Of the nine detailed industries within Transportation, four 
grew moderately and five went into decline not a consistent growth 
sector in comparison to the 17 above it on the list. After "Transpor 
tation" comes "Mining," wherein employment was essentially stag 
nant. Therefore, it seems that "Utilities and sanitary services," which
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Table 2A-1 




























































































































































































SOURCE: Employment and Earnings, 1/80 and 1/87.
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experienced a solid employment expansion, should be included as a 
high-growth industry, while "Transportation" (and of course 
"Mining") should be excluded.
By excluding "Transportation equipment" as a statistical aberration 
and including "Utilities and sanitary services," we end up with 18 
growth sectors. Total employment in growth sectors was 66 million in 
1979 and 80 million in 1986, an increase of 21.3 percent. Meanwhile, 
aggregate employment in the remaining sectors (slow-growing and 
declining) shrunk by 4.8 percent, from 31 million to 29 million. By 
1986, almost three out of every four employed civilians were in a 
growth sector (73.4 percent).
1. Important changes which we have adjusted for are the transfer of the postal service from 
"public administration" to "transportation," and movement of "ordinance" from "other du 
rable goods industries" into the "fabricated metals" category.
2. SIC terminology can be confusing. "Transportation" which involves the physical move 
ment of people and goods by surface, air, and water is one two-digit category, while "Trans 
portation equipment (manufacturing)" is another.
Appendix 2-B
Regression Results of the Effects of 




Effects of Dislocation on January 1986 Weekly Earnings 
of Private Nonagricultural Male Workers: Sample 1
Dependent variable: Log of current earnings 
Sample: Dislocated workers laid off from full-time jobs and reemployed; other full-time workers
Intercept
20-24 years of age
35-44 years of age
45-61 years of age
< 1 2 years education











DW x occup. move
DW x same occup.
DW x plant closing





























































































































































































NOTE: f-statistics in parenthesis
*** significant at 99%
** significant at 95%
* significant at 90%
Table 2B-2
Effects of Dislocation on January 1986 Weekly Earnings 
of Private Nonagricultural Male Workers: Sample 2
Dependent variable: Log of current earnings 
Sample: Dislocated workers laid off from full-time jobs and reemployed in full-time jobs; other full- 
time workers
Intercept
20-24 years of age
35-44 years of age
45-61 years of age












DW x occup. move
DW x same occup.
DW x plant closing





























































































































































































NOTE: r-statistics in parenthesis
*** significant at 99%
** significant at 95%
* significant at 90%
Table 2B-3
Effects of Dislocation on January 1986 Weekly Earnings 
of Private Nonagricultural Male Workers: Sample 3
Dependent variable: Log of current earnings 
Sample: All workers
Intercept
20-24 years of age
35-44 years of age
45-61 years of age
< 1 2 years education











DW x occup. move
DW x same occup.
DW x plant closing

































































































































































































































NOTE: /-statistics in parenthesis
*** significant at 99%
** significant at 95%
* significant at 90%
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Table 2B-4 
Sample Means for Variables Included in Earnings Regressions
Hours per week
Dislocated worker
20-24 years of age
35-44 years of age
45-61 years of age
< 12 years education













DW x occ. move





DW x plant closing
DW x other layoff


















































































































































The Road to Recovery
In a recent television documentary on the closing of a forklift plant 
in Pennsylvania, two workers were filmed discussing their misfortune. 
One of the workers remarked that they were "dinosaurs," a dying 
breed of Americans who work with their "hands and their minds." 
While certainly not extinct, available data do show that the displaced 
worker is a markedly different breed from the growth-sector worker, or 
for that matter from the average full-time worker (table 3.1). Natu 
rally, a disproportionate share of the displaced are from declining and 
slow-growing sectors, specifically manufacturing (48 percent), and 
transportation, communication, and utilities (8 percent). In compari 
son, only 31 percent of all full-time workers are employed in manu 
facturing.
In these and other respects, displaced workers are a reflection of 
yesterday©s workforce two-thirds are male, nearly 60 percent are 
blue-collar, 47 percent graduated from high school, and 20 percent had 
not gone that far. Among the blue-collar displaced, 64 percent are 
semiskilled. 1 If growth-sector employees represent the worker of the 
future, the displaced population does not make for a good fit. Within 
growth sectors, only 22 percent of full-time workers are blue-collar, 
and most of these are in skilled craft and repair occupations. In addi 
tion, almost half of full-time, growth-sector workers are female, only 
12 percent have not graduated from high school, and 22 percent have 
a four-year college degree.
When following the fortunes of these job losers, it is evident that 
worker displacement is a primary mechanism through which the Amer 
ican economy is making the transition into service sector and white-
61
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Table 3.1 
Characteristics of Displaced Workers and Other Full-Time Workers8
Workers Full-time 
displaced from growth- 


















Not a high school graduate
High school graduate
1-3 years posthigh school
4 years + posthigh school








































































a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 
20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a full-time, private, nonagricultural, 
wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent 
reduction in force, or slack work, without recall as of January 1986. 
b. See appendix 2-A for a description of how the growth sector was defined.
collar employment. Certainly, other, more benign mechanisms are also 
used early retirement, voluntary turnover, and the emphasis upon 
technical trades in vocational secondary schools and upgraded educa 
tional systems in general. Displacement impresses itself upon us be 
cause it is exactly the mechanism which has the potential to create 
dinosaurs, workers who are caught between the old world of skilled 
and semiskilled work with "hands and minds" and the new world of 
the growth sectors.
Displaced workers have several recovery roads from which to 
choose. One is to find work in a promising new field, in hopes of
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avoiding a large earnings decline. A successful transition from a de 
clining industry to a growing one at a comparable rate of pay is, of 
course, most desirable; it serves the broad-based economic goal of 
flexible adjustment, while limiting the personal suffering of the job 
loser. But, as we saw in the previous chapter, the educational require 
ments within growing industries are formidable, particularly at com 
parable rates of pay. Such an adjustment, although attractive to all in 
terms of the earnings outcome, is likely to require a large allocation of 
training and education resources (not to mention the "opportunity 
cost" of the worker©s lost earnings during the retraining period). For 
policy purposes, this would necessitate a larger commitment to fun 
damental retraining than that currently available.
A second option is the rapid movement of displaced workers into 
growth industries and occupations. This can be a risky strategy for 
many job losers, however, since the earnings distribution in ex 
panding sectors is more clearly determined by educational background 
than in declining fields. In other words, on average, those with a high 
school degree or less fare much better in manufacturing than they do 
in the service-producing sectors. Without an educational upgrade, the 
movement into growth sectors can result in substantial earnings de 
clines; absent his or her machinery, the formerly high-productivity/ 
highly-paid manufacturing worker is at risk of becoming a low-pro 
ductivity/low-paid service worker. While lower-wage reemployment is 
better than no employment, neither policy makers nor workers are 
pleased when a high-productivity job is lost and a low-productivity job 
takes its place. In fact, this is just the kind of transition that a job loser 
will work to avoid.
For the blue-collar and manufacturing workers who make up a dis 
proportionate fraction of the displacement population, there is a third 
option obtaining new jobs in the declining sector from which they 
were laid off, or at least in a familiar blue-collar setting. At first blush, 
this option may not appear favorable, since the long-term prognosis in 
manufacturing is continued decline. The search for a new, comparable- 
wage job in a declining sector can be long and arduous, given the small 
number of job openings relative to growth industries, and recall pro 
visions governing much of the unionized sector. And then, even if the
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search is successful, common seniority practices within manufacturing 
may work against the displaced worker. Come the next downturn or 
"restructuring," the displaced worker is likely to be right back out on 
the street.
While acknowledging the difficulties associated with this third op 
tion, it is too often overlooked in policy discussions on worker adjust 
ment. What has become evident is that, for many workers, reemploy- 
ment in a familiar setting stabilizes earnings levels. For the displaced 
worker with some job experience, the added difficulty of finding a 
familiar job may well be offset by the additional earnings from a 
comparable-wage job. As we shall see, many workers who would be 
considered vulnerable to earnings loss are instead making blue-collar 
transitions which avoid downward mobility, but still take relatively 
long periods of time to complete successfully.
In this chapter, we view these options as both policy alternatives and 
worker choices. Just as individuals must select a primary road to 
recovery, the federal government must also determine what it will help 
workers to achieve. Policymakers must come to grips with the impli 
cations of recent economic changes and the tradeoffs they pose for 
facilitating successful worker adjustment. Of the three options pre 
sented above, two would focus on helping workers obtain comparable- 
wage jobs, through either extended job search or education and skill 
upgrading. The third option would forego comparable wages in favor 
of a policy that emphasized rapid reemployment, preferably in a 
growth sector.
While reemployment in a comparable-wage job is, to many, the 
preferred option, it may not always be feasible. The program invest 
ments needed by many workers to overcome the education and training 
gaps they face may be too great to pursue in the current policy and 
spending context. And although programs can help workers simply 
search for comparable-wage jobs, the relatively long time it would take 
may be too much for society to endorse, or financially support. At the 
same time, the wage losses that often result from policies emphasizing 
rapid reemployment may also be unpalatable to both policymakers and 
unemployed workers themselves. Vexing as they may be, these issues 
define the challenges of worker displacement policy. As a result, it is
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quite important to consider carefully each policy option and the types 
of program investments that would be necessary to ensure their suc 
cess.
Accordingly, we now turn to an assessment of the feasibility and 
appropriateness of these policy alternatives. We accomplish this by 
extending the analysis in the previous chapter to the recent postlayoff 
experience of displaced workers, paying particular attention to the use 
made by these workers of the above three options. The analysis relies 
on the Displaced Worker Supplement to the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in January 1986. 
The CPS is a monthly survey of a random sample of approximately 
60,000 U.S. households, and is most commonly known as the source 
for U.S. unemployment rate estimates.
The supplemental displacement data were gathered on all household 
members within the CPS aged 20 or older who lost or left a job in the 
five years preceding the survey because of a plant closing, permanent 
reduction in force, layoff without recall as of January 1986, or some 
similar reason. Those identified as displaced were asked a series of 
follow-up questions about their former job and the time since it was 
lost. The answers allow for a comparison of the current and former 
jobs by earnings level, occupation, and industry.
Our analysis sample includes 5,294 private, nonagricultural, wage- 
salary workers between the ages of 20 and 61 who lost or left a 
full-time job because of a plant closing, permanent reduction in force, 
or slack work between January 1981 and January 1986. 2 Unlike other 
studies, we have not excluded workers with limited tenure from the 
analysis. Such exclusions introduce statistical biases as a result of 
nonrandom sample selection, and potentially exclude a group of work 
ers who may well have readjustment problems following layoff. Low 
tenure does not imply weak attachment to the labor force or to an 
occupation or industry. In many instances, low-tenure workers could 
have been laid off after accepting a particular job. In the face of "hired 
last-fired first" seniority provisions in many firms, these workers may 
find themselves going from one low-tenure job to another, especially 
in high unemployment areas. Like other displaced workers, they face 
the prospect of postlayoff readjustment problems.
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The regular monthly CPS data is also used to make general com 
parisons between displaced workers, full-time growth-sector workers, 
and all full-time workers. The CPS also provides data which can be 
used to estimate the national wage distribution. A random one-fourth 
of all workers in the regular CPS report their weekly wages. This 
random sample is used to calculate the wage distribution of all full- 
time workers in January 1986, and to conduct comparisons between 
the displaced and the general population of full-time workers.
Patterns of Reemployment
By January 1986, the United States was in its fourth year of an 
economic expansion. For displaced workers, the ability to find reem- 
ployment and the number of weeks spent unemployed conform closely 
to general expectations about the difficulties facing manufacturing and 
blue-collar workers (table 3.2). Among all full-time workers displaced 
during the year immediately preceding the survey (i.e., losing jobs in 
1985), only 40 percent had found full-time reemployment. Another 10 
percent were working part time but, for the most part, desired a full- 
time job, while an additional 42 percent were recorded as unemployed. 
The remaining 9 percent opted out of the labor force altogether (al 
though some were no doubt discouraged workers who had given up an 
active job search). While these reemployment rates are not high, they 
reflect the immediate postdisplacement experience. The experience of 
those displaced some time ago tell us more about the enduring impacts 
of job loss.
Workers displaced in 1984 (i.e., at least one full year before the 
survey) were more successful in finding new employment. By January 
1986, 65 percent were reemployed full time and only 15.8 percent 
were unemployed. In fact, it seems that after a year or two, the expe 
rience of the displaced levels off at about 65 to 70 percent who become 
reemployed full time, 10 to 11 percent who find part-time work (half 
of whom desire full-time work), 8 to 9 percent who remain unem 
ployed, and 11 to 13 percent who drop out of the labor force. In other 
words, two years following displacement, the conventional unemploy 
ment rate for the displaced (the unemployed as a fraction of the active
Table 3.2 
Reemployment Rates and Total Weeks of Unemployment Since Lost Joba (Row percentages are shown)
Employment status as of January 1986
Total weeks of unem 
ployment since lost job









Executive, Prof., Mgt. 
Technical
Sales
Admin, support and clerical 
Service






Less than high school graduate 
High school graduate 
1-3 years posthigh school 



























































































































































































































a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a full-time, private, 
nonagricultural, wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent reduction in force, or slack work, without recall as of January 
1986.
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labor force) drops to about 9 to 11 percent, at a time when the national 
unemployment rate was hovering around 7 percent.
As would be expected, unemployment probabilities increase for 
workers from declining sectors, from blue-collar occupations, for the 
less educated, and to some extent for men. Among semiskilled, blue- 
collar workers, who constitute over one-third of the displacement pop 
ulation, 26 percent were unemployed at the time of the survey and 39 
percent had more than half a year of unemployment after layoff. For 
those with less than a high school education the situation was worse; 
29 percent were unemployed at the time of the survey and 41 percent 
had more than half a year of unemployment since layoff.
Optimistically, one might hope that the pattern of reemployment 
follows the growth sectors of the economy. This would facilitate flex 
ible labor market adjustment and the ability of worker assistance pro 
grams to place individuals in jobs. Indeed, the experience of displaced 
workers indicates that many workers do find new jobs in growing 
sectors. Just over 60 percent of all reemployed workers found their job 
in a growth industry, and nearly 46 percent moved there from a slow 
growing or declining industry (table 3.3).
In addition, most reemployed job losers change occupation, indus 
try, or both. The Bureau of the Census identifies 13 detailed occupa 
tional groupings (from "executive, administrative, and managerial" to 
"handlers and equipment cleaners") and 22 major industries (from 
"mining" to "hospitals"). Using these categories, only 23 percent of 
the reemployed remain in their old detailed industry and occupation; 44 
percent change both industry and occupation, while another 12 percent 
change occupation while remaining in the old industry. On the surface, 
it seems that displacement is typically followed by substantial occu 
pational and interindustry mobility.
A closer examination of the data reveals less fundamental mobility 
by occupation and industry. The job loser, while often changing his or 
her specific occupation or industry, tends to stay in the same general 
economic sector. On the whole, blue-collar workers are finding new, 
blue-collar jobs, and workers from declining industries are becoming 
reemployed in new jobs within those same industries. By this account, 
the labor market does not appear as flexible across sectors as it does
Table 3.3 














Changed major industry and
occupation
Same major industry and occupation
Moved to new city or county



























































































































a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a 
full-time, private, nonagricultural, wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent reduction in force, 
or slack work, without recall as of January 1986.
b. The 13 major occupations in the Current Population Survey include eight white-collar and service categories, "farm, forestry, and fisheries," craft 
and repair (skilled blue-collar), and three semiskilled blue-collar occupational categories.
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within them. Following layoff, the majority of workers seem to end up 
in the same broad field in which they began. If policy makers wish to 
pursue a strategy of intersector mobility, they will have to overcome a 
strong behavioral link between displaced workers and the job oppor 
tunities they face.
For example, only 25 percent of skilled and 37 percent of semi 
skilled blue-collar workers moved into white-collar and service jobs, 
while the majority found new blue-collar employment. Moreover, 54 
percent of workers from the declining and slow-growing industries 
found new jobs within these same industries (which include all of 
manufacturing plus transportation, communication, and public utili 
ties).
Although semiskilled blue-collar workers are more likely to move 
into white-collar and service jobs than skilled workers, almost two- 
thirds remain in blue-collar positions, half become reemployed in tra 
ditional goods-producing industries, and about half find jobs in slow- 
growing and declining industries. Displaced white-collar and service 
workers often change industry and occupation, but the vast majority 
(85 percent) find new white-collar and service jobs, and almost 70 
percent are reemployed in the high-growth sectors.
Why do blue-collar workers have such an obvious preference for 
blue-collar and declining sector jobs, despite the relative scarcity of 
such positions? Part of the answer lies in their qualifications for grow 
ing jobs and the risk of experiencing an earnings loss. To see this, we 
divided the January 1986 sample of all full-time workers into four 
quartiles of equal size. The low-wage quartile earned less than $237 
per week, the low-middle $237-$350, the high-middle $351-$500, 
and the high-wage quartile more than $500 weekly. 3 We then com 
pared the human capital attributes of displaced workers with those of 
other workers in each quartile. Our results show clearly that the dis 
placed are not well matched to either the average job in the economy 
or those in growth sectors. As would be expected, these mismatches 
increase as one moves up the earnings ladder (table 3.4).
For example, while displaced workers are fairly well-represented in 
the upper two earnings quartiles on their old jobs, the vehicle through 
which they achieved this high-wage status is quite different from that
Table 3.4
Selected Characteristics of Displaced Workers, All Full-Time Workers and 






















































































































































































































































a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a 
full-time, private, nonagricultural wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent reduction in force, or 
slack work, without recall as of January 1986.
b. The earnings quartiles are based on the national full-time wage and salary distribution of all workers employed in January 1986. See page 70 for a 
description of the cutoffs.
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for the average worker and strikingly different from that of the 
growth-sector worker. Typically, the higher-wage worker is relatively 
well-educated, and productivity is clearly tied to his or her many years 
of schooling and professional training. In the highest earnings quartile 
in January 1986, for example, 41 percent of all workers had a four-year 
college degree, while only 35 percent had a high school degree or less. 
For growth-sector workers in the highest quartile, education is even 
more important: 46 percent have a four-year degree, and only 29 
percent have a high school degree or less education.
In comparison, displaced workers in the highest-wage quartile have 
earned that position in large part through on-the-job skills, which are 
not directly related to formal educational achievement. Only 26 per 
cent of the high-wage displaced have a four-year college degree, 11 
percent never completed high school, and 38 percent are high school 
graduates. The educational gap reflects the occupational disparities 
between the displaced and the growth-sector workers. Over half of the 
high-wage displaced are blue-collar workers, while only one in five 
growth-sector jobs is blue-collar. Moreover, those blue-collar jobs that 
are available in growth sectors tend to be skilled positions, while many 
of the job-losers were in semiskilled jobs.
At lower wage levels, there are fewer disparities between the edu 
cational backgrounds of displaced workers, full-time workers, and 
growth-sector workers in general, but a small educational gap remains. 
Many low-wage workers are women in sales, administrative support, 
service, and unskilled manufacturing positions. Lower-wage occupa 
tions experiencing rapid employment growth are concentrated in the 
service and trading sectors. On average, employees in these low-wage 
jobs are slightly more educated than the displaced workers, many of 
whom are losing semiskilled blue-collar jobs. However, the educa 
tional gap is relatively small, and the prospects for maintaining wage 
levels would seem to be somewhat better for these lower-wage dis 
placed than for their higher-wage counterparts.
These comparisons are consistent with the broad labor market 
trends discussed in the previous chapter. They suggest that many job- 
losers, particularly those from higher-wage blue-collar jobs, will qual- 
lify for few of the white-collar and service jobs at comparable-wage
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levels, while lower-wage workers will likely find job offers across a 
broader spectrum of less skilled occupations. While this helps to 
explain the limited number of workers who change industries and 
occupations, it also suggests that a short-term investment strategy, 
such as that adopted under JTPA, may be best suited for workers in 
the bottom half of the wage and salary distribution. Although these 
workers will often need educational upgrading and occupational 
training, the required investment is limited by the large number of 
other lower-wage opportunities for which they are more or less 
already qualified.
In stark contrast is the higher-wage, blue-collar worker. Compared 
to other high-wage workers, these individuals have significant educa 
tion and training deficiencies. Absent substantial training investments, 
programs will have little else to offer many of them than simply a job, 
or assistance in finding one. While some will be lucky enough to return 
to their layoff field, for others, such assistance can often amount to 
accepting an earnings loss and some amount of de-skilling. As we have 
seen, workers have a clear interest in avoiding this, by virtue of their 
searching for opportunities in their old fields of employment.
Reemployment patterns by layoff wage confirm this result. Among 
high-wage, skilled, blue-collar workers finding new jobs, 80 percent 
remain in blue-collar occupations, and a full 40 percent are working in 
their old occupation and industry (table 3.5). Moving down the wage 
distribution, there is more mobility. In the lowest earnings quartile, 
over one-third of displaced skilled workers finding new jobs moved 
into white-collar and service occupations, and only 19 percent found 
jobs in their old major industry and occupation.
Further evidence of the likely reluctance of high-wage skilled work 
ers to move into new types of jobs can be found in the data on geo 
graphic mobility. Among the skilled workers from the highest wage 
quartile, 27 percent of the reemployed moved to a new city or county 
in order to look for or accept a new job. This represents a relatively 
high rate of geographic mobility, over 10 percentage points greater 
than that for skilled workers in each of the three lower-wage quartiles. 
Clearly, the higher-wage workers may well be moving to avoid the 
earnings declines associated with movement into new occupations and
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Table 3.5
Reemployment Mechanisms Among Dislocated Workers, 
by Layoff Wage Quartile and Occupation3
Former wage quartileb
Reemployment mechanisms








Changed major occupation/same industry 
Changed major industry/same occupation 
Changed major industry and occupation 
Same major industry and occupation
Moved to new city/county to 
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Changed major industry/same occupation 
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Same major industry and occupation
Moved to new city/county to 
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Same major industry and occupation
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a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 
20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a full-time, private, nonagricultural, 
wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent 
reduction in force, or slack work, without recall as of January 1986.
b. The earnings quartiles are based on the national full-time wage and salary distribution of all 
workers employed in January 1986. See page 70 for a description of the cutoffs.
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industries: 69 percent of the highest-wage skilled workers were reem- 
ployed in the goods-producing industries.
Semiskilled blue-collar workers are, in general, less likely to move 
into growth sectors than their skilled counterparts, no matter what their 
former earnings quartile (in some parts of the country there has been 
substantial growth in skilled construction jobs, which may account for 
the difference). Occupational mobility is more common among the 
semiskilled, but again varies according to the former wage quartile. 
The rate of mobility into white-collar and service occupations is 46 
percent for the lowest-wage workers, but only 28 percent for the high 
est-wage workers. Like skilled workers, the semiskilled seem to be 
avoiding the transition into white-collar and service work, especially 
when displaced from higher-wage jobs.
Nevertheless, a surprising result from the CPS displaced worker 
survey is the overall degree of success enjoyed by many displaced 
workers in finding comparable-wage jobs. For example, of our sample 
of displaced full-time workers who were working for pay in January 
1986, 40 percent had higher real earnings on the new job than on the 
lost job, while 32 percent saw their earnings reduced to less than 
three-fourths of the predisplacement level.
Typically, comparisons between layoff and reemployment earnings 
have followed this approach and analyzed earnings loss in percentage 
change terms. 4 This offers the advantage of simplicity and allows one 
to directly observe the magnitude of the loss (or gain) overall and on 
a subgroup basis. Here, however, we have chosen instead to assess the 
relative earnings position of displaced workers by analyzing their 
movement across each of the quartiles of the wage and salary distri 
bution. While less precise in judging the size of any earnings change, 
this approach does allow one to determine how displacement has af 
fected a key social indicator one©s standing in the earnings distribu 
tion. This makes judgments of earnings loss more intuitively appealing 
and also provides a bounded target rather than a particular level for 
defining a comparable-wage job. It does, however, have the disadvan 
tage of potentially masking large, within-quartile changes, and like 
percentage changes, overstating any earnings loss for those workers
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Table 3.6 
_________Job Changing and Relative Earnings8_________
All 
full-time ______Former wage quartilc"_____
displaced Lowest Low-middle High-middle Highest
Number 5,061 1,324 1,372 1,211 1,153 
reemployed (OOOs)













































NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are median ratio between January 1986 weekly earnings and
former earnings. Former earnings are inflated to January 1986 dollars using the CPI.
a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged
20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a full-time, private, nonagricultural,
wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent
reduction in force, or slack work, without recall as of January 1986.
b. The earnings quartiles are based on the national full-time wage and salary distribution of all
workers employed in January 1986. See page 70 for a description of the cutoffs.
who, at the time of layoff, were at the lower bound of any one 
quartile. 5
Overall, our results show that roughly two-thirds of reemployed 
displaced workers found jobs that allowed them to remain in their old 
wage quartile or move up (table 3.6). Workers from the higher-wage 
quartiles had the most difficulty maintaining their relative earnings, 
but even they were successful in doing so about half the time. For 
workers in the three higher-wage quartiles finding new jobs in their old 
quartiles, the median ratio of present to former earnings was 100 
percent. In other words, most workers were able to maintain or im 
prove their earnings position.
What this obscures, however, is the not unsubstantial fraction of 
displaced workers who suffer a severe drop in their earnings position. 
Among the highest-quartile workers, for example, 27 percent move 
into the high-middle quartile, 14 percent into the low-middle quartile,
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and 9 percent fall all the way down into the lowest quartile. The 
median ratios of present to former earnings as a result of this down 
ward mobility are .74, .43, and .26, respectively. Over half of those 
losing jobs in the high-middle quartile are reemployed in the lower two 
quartiles, while 35 percent of those in the low-middle quartile move 
down into the lowest quartile. Therefore, while many displaced work 
ers are successful in finding comparable-wage reemployment, hun 
dreds of thousands experience downward mobility in both an absolute 
and relative sense.
Given the emphasis in other research upon percentage earnings 
changes following job loss, we also assessed the relationship between 
these changes and movements within and across the earnings distri 
bution. Two findings, in particular, are worth noting. The first is that 
large percentage reductions in earnings (e.g., greater than 25 percent) 
rarely leave a worker in the same quartile. Regardless of one©s status 
at the time of layoff, percentage reductions in excess of 25 percent are 
never experienced by more than 32 percent of those maintaining their 
status in the distribution; as would be expected, this percentage share 
declines rapidly as one moves down the distribution. Overall, those 
workers whose earnings drop by more than 25 percent typically also 
drop down the distribution by at least one quartile.
Second, there is some evidence that movements down the distribu 
tion may be influenced by relatively small percentage reductions 
among workers whose layoff earnings were at or near the lower bound 
of a quartile. However, this occurrence was generally limited to those 
experiencing percentage losses of less than 25 percent and was most 
evident among higher-wage workers. Take, for example, workers who 
began in the highest quartile of the distribution (weekly earnings in 
excess of $500) and became reemployed in the second highest quartile 
of the wage and salary distribution. Among these workers, 47 percent 
experienced a percentage earnings decline of no more than 25 percent, 
suggesting that their layoff earnings were likely close to the lower 
cutoff of the quartile. In contrast, among workers beginning in the next 
to lowest quartile and becoming reemployed in the lowest quartile of 
the distribution, only 26 percent experienced a percentage reduction of 
less than 25 percent. For these workers, 48 percent experienced a 50
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to 74 percent earnings reduction, while the remainder had reemploy- 
ment earnings that were less than half of those on the layoff job.
On balance, these results suggest that within-quartile movements are 
rarely associated with large percentage wage reductions, and that rel 
atively small losses of less than 25 percent do not usually result in 
movements down the wage and salary distribution. The findings also 
indicate that the focus of prior studies on percentage losses in excess 
of 25 percent may well be an appropriate cutoff to signal the need for 
concern and assistance. In addition to its magnitude per se, earnings 
losses of this size are usually sufficient to drop a worker down at least 
one quartile in the wage and salary distribution.
A good deal of the downward mobility which does occur seems to 
follow from the human capital gaps that many displaced workers face. 
These gaps increase substantially as one moves up the earnings ladder 
and appear to limit the types of changes that workers are either willing 
or able to make. Those faced with no alternative but to change fields 
of work are most at risk to earnings loss. As a result, programs and 
policies to assist these workers must either help them obtain compa 
rable jobs or counsel them to enter a new line of work. As is becoming 
evident, either can be a difficult task.
Relative Human Capital and Earnings
It is useful to analyze the reemployment wage patterns of displaced 
workers as resulting from the transferability (or lack thereof) of human 
capital across comparable-wage jobs. While displaced-worker pro 
grams are attuned to the notion of improving human capital, not 
enough attention has been paid to the scope of the investment needed 
to facilitate a successful readjustment. We have seen that some dis 
placed workers are particularly at risk today because they lack human 
capital relative to workers in growth sectors of the economy, and most 
especially relative to those earning wages comparable to that which the 
job loser is accustomed. Further, the gap in human capital is as much 
in general education as it is in specific vocational skills. For workers 
under family pressure to find comparable-wage employment, the gap 
can seem insurmountable. It is a worker©s relative human capital i.e.
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his or her mix of skills and abilities relative to those workers in the 
same earnings class which is most likely to determine the degree of 
earnings replacement on the new job.
If we follow the earnings outcome of displaced workers in the 
higher-wage quartiles, the importance of human capital transferability 
becomes quite evident (table 3.7). Beginning with workers displaced 
from the highest wage and salary quartile, recall that, overall, 49 
percent of the reemployed remained in the highest quartile. However, 
in the current labor market environment, general education and other 
"growth-sector skills" appear to be much more valuable than experi 
ence in a blue-collar setting. As a result, a full 69 percent of reem 
ployed executive, professional, and managerial workers were able to 
remain in the highest-wage quartile, as did 52 percent of technical 
workers. Sales workers, clericals, and service workers had relatively 
little success maintaining high-wage positions; however, few of these 
workers had high-wage jobs to begin with.
Among skilled blue-collar workers from the highest-wage quartile, 
the situation was not as favorable. Less than 50 percent of the reem 
ployed found new, high-wage jobs, while 20 percent dropped to the 
lower half of the wage distribution. 6 For the semiskilled, the situation 
is even worse. Once reemployed, these high-wage workers spread out 
almost evenly throughout the wage distribution. One-fifth end up in the 
lowest-earnings quartile, 23 percent become reemployed in the low- 
middle quartile, and only 29 percent are able to maintain their relative 
earnings position. Among displaced workers from the high-middle 
quartile, the situation is similar: skilled blue-collar workers, on aver 
age, drop their earnings position to some extent, while the semiskilled 
take it on the chin.
The relative human capital gap in general education for high-wage 
displaced workers also affects their reemployment earnings. Among 
those with less than a high school education, only 21 percent of the 
highest-wage workers and 31 percent of high-middle wage workers are 
able to maintain (or improve) their earnings position. High school 
graduates have somewhat better success in finding comparable-wage 
jobs (40 percent for the highest-wage quartile, 43 percent for the 
high-middle quartile). But these success rates pale against those for
Table 3.7
Relative Earnings of Reemployed Displaced Workers by Wage Quartilea © b 
(Row percentages are shown)




Less than high school graduate 
High school graduate 
1-3 years post-high school 
4-year college graduate
Layoff Occupation
Executive and professional 
Technical
Sales














































































































a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a 
full-time, private, nonagricultural wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent reduction in force, or 
slack work, without recall as of January 1986.
b. The earnings quartiles are based on the national full-time wage and salary distribution of all workers employed in January 1986. See page 70 for a 
description of the cutoffs.
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4-year college graduates (71 percent of highest-wage college grads find 
comparable-wage jobs, as do 66 percent of high-middle wage work 
ers). Clearly, educated and highly skilled workers are better able to 
maintain their productivity, and therefore their wage levels, when 
displaced from jobs.
These results imply that the reemployment pattern which generates 
the most downward mobility is likely to be movement into new occu 
pations and industries. To test this generally, we compared the earn 
ings of displaced workers who became reemployed in new occupa 
tional areas with those of other employed workers, controlling for 
differences in human capital and personal characteristics. 7 Our find 
ings revealed that the reemployment earnings of these workers were, 
on average, 23 percent less than other similar workers, and approxi 
mately 15 percent less than displaced workers who found jobs in a 
similar occupational field. It thus appears that changes in one©s occu 
pational field can indeed have an adverse effect on reemployment 
earnings.
This result is also evident on a subgroup basis and particularly 
among higher-wage and blue-collar workers (table 3.8). Among re- 
employed, skilled, blue-collar workers from the highest-wage quartile 
who changed both their major industry and occupation, two-thirds 
experienced downward mobility, and over 40 percent actually moved 
down into the bottom half of the wage distribution. Only 41 percent of 
those reemployed in white-collar and service jobs remained in the 
highest-wage quartile, as compared to 56 percent of workers finding 
new, skilled, blue-collar jobs.
The risks for high-wage semiskilled workers of changing occupation 
and industry are also substantial; nearly 85 percent of these workers 
experienced downward wage mobility. In comparison, almost half of 
those reemployed in their old industry and occupation remain in the 
highest-wage quartile. For the semiskilled, the movement into white- 
collar and service work is a recipe for wage reduction: 32 percent end 
up in the lowest quartile, another 23 percent in the low-middle quartile.
Why are the less educated and semiskilled workers so greatly af 
fected by the displacement process? The answer is not simply that 
"good jobs" are being replaced by "bad jobs." If this was true we
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Table 3.8
High-Wage Displaced Workers: Patterns of Earnings Change3 
(Row percentages are shown)
Reemployment job characteristics 
for high-wage workers




Changed major occupation/same industry 
Changed major industry/same occupation 
Changed major industry and occupation 





Changed major occupation/same industry 
Changed major industry/same occupation 
Changed major industry and occupation 
Same major industry and occupation




Changed major occupation/same industry 
Changed major industry/same occupation 
Changed major industry and occupation 
Same major industry and occupation

























































































a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 
20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a full-time, private, nonagricultural, 
wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent 
reduction in force, or slack work, without recall as of January 1986.
b. The earnings quartiles are based on the national full-time wage and salary distribution of all 
workers employed in January 1986. See page 70 for a description of the cutoffs.
would expect all of the displaced to suffer proportionately. In fact, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, the service economy is creating 
ample shares of both good and bad jobs, but the good jobs being 
created in growth sectors today are concentrated in white-collar work 
to a degree that they were not previously. The economy is trading 
decent blue-collar jobs for a range of service sector ones. It is the 
education and training gap between the high-wage, less educated dis 
placed and their comparable-wage, growth-sector counterparts that is 
creating difficulties for job-losers.
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It is true that the displaced skilled and semiskilled worker can 
readily move into growth sectors but more often than not as a health 
aide, a fast-food worker, or possibly a sales clerk or typist. The com 
parable-wage jobs that are available in growth sectors are mostly re 
served for college graduates and those with years of prior service in the 
emergent industries. This situation creates a challenge for employment 
and training policy, which must find a way to fit the worker into the 
available supply of job vacancies.
As we have seen, this challenge revolves around the prior earnings 
and experience of displaced workers and whether the policy emphasis 
is on reemployment per se, or reemployment in a comparable-wage 
job. The feasibility or reemployment at comparable wages seems to be 
limited by the large human capital gaps between displaced and other 
workers, especially at the upper ends of the wage and salary distribu 
tion. In these cases, one cannot help but wonder if the required pro 
gram investments are practical social objectives and program strate 
gies. Part of the answer to this dilemma depends on the region in which 
workers reside, since most displaced workers search for new jobs in 
their initial areas of residence.
Displacement and Region
It is not only the human capital characteristics of less educated and 
semiskilled workers per se that place them at risk following displace 
ment. It is also the fit between the job-loser and the skill mix in a 
particular local labor market that is important. Two factors on the 
demand side of the labor market are of primary importance: (1) the 
overall degree of economic expansion, which, together with attrition, 
will determine the number of job openings and the rate of wage 
growth; and (2) the differences between the skill requirements, edu 
cational requirements, and wage opportunities in expanding and de 
clining sectors. Overall growth rates will influence the length of job 
search for the displaced, and will, in combination with the human 
capital "match" between job-losers and growth-sector workers, affect 
the earnings position of the displaced following layoff.
Variations in the economic performance of different regions of the 
U.S. provide a basis for assessing further the relationship between
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economic growth, relative human capital, and postdisplacement out 
comes. As discussed in the last chapter, regions have varied substan 
tially with respect to both their overall rate of expansion and the types 
of jobs being eliminated and created. By comparing the experiences of 
displaced workers across regions, we can better judge the importance 
of these varying demand-side factors upon the adjustment process.
To explore the impact of regional economic conditions on displaced 
workers, we selected five of the census regions for further study: New 
England (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, Connecticut); Mid-Allan tic (New York, New Jersey, and Penn 
sylvania); East North Central (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wis 
consin); South Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland, D.C., Virginia, West 
Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida); and West 
South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas). Each of 
these regions had large numbers of displaced workers as reported in the 
January 1986 survey, but varied greatly in terms of overall economic 
conditions and patterns of employment growth and decline (table 3.9).
Like that for the U.S., the picture that emerges from the reemploy- 
ment patterns in the various regions is one of relative industrial and 
occupational immobility, even in those areas where overall economic 
conditions have been favorable (table 3.10). Overall, large proportions 
of workers from all regions became reemployed in their layoff industry 
and occupation as well as in goods-producing, declining, and slow- 
growing sectors. In the East North Central states, for example, 48 
percent of reemployed workers found jobs in goods-production and 42 
percent were reemployed in slow-growing or declining industries. This 
relative immobility occurred despite the precipitous decline of the 
goods-producing sector in that region, and in contrast to the national 
averages (42 percent and 39 percent, respectively).
In New England, with more favorable economic conditions, workers 
also tended to remain in their old lines of work. Only 37 percent of 
reemployed job-losers changed both their industry and occupation, 
compared to a national average of 44 percent. In the other relatively 
healthy divisions (the Mid-Atlantic and South Atlantic) the rates of 
industry and occupational job changing were also at or slightly below 
the average. However, in the West South Central region, a full 50
Table 3.9 
Economic Indicators by Census Division, 1979-1985
Census division
Economic Indicators










































































































































































































a. Employment and Earnings, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.
b. Survey of Current Business, U.S. Department of Commerce, April 1986.
c. Data refer to wage and salary workers aged 16 to 61, employed in private, nonagricultural jobs. Estimates calculated by authors, based on March
Supplements to the Current Population Survey, 
d. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 20-61 in January 1986.
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Table 3.10
Reemployment Mechanisms by Selected Census Divisions, 
January 1986a
Census division of residence, January 1986
Reemployment mechanisms 







Divisional high growth sector 
Divisional slow growth/declining
Changed major occupation/same industry 
Changed major industry/same occupation 
Changed major industry and occupation 
Same major industry and occupation
Moved to new city/county to 
accept/look for new job






Divisional high growth sector 
Divisional slow growth/declining
Changed major occupation/same industry 
Changed major industry/same occupation 
Changed major industry and occupation 
Same major industry and occupation
Moved to new city/county to 
accept/look for new job






Divisional high growth sector 
Divisional slow growth/declining
Changed major occupation/same industry 
Changed major industry/same occupation 
Changed major industry and occupation 
Same major industry and occupation
Moved to new city/county to 
accept/look for new job
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Table 3.10 continued
Reemployment Mechanisms by Selected Census Divisions, 
January 1986*
Census division of residence, January 1986
Reemployment mechanisms




Divisional high growth sector
Divisional slow growth/declining
Changed major occupation/same industry
Changed major industry/same occupation
Changed major industry and occupation
Same industry and occupation
Moved to new city/county to































































a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 
20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a full-time, private, nonagricultural, 
wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent 
reduction in force, or slack work, without recall as of January 1986.
percent of the reemployed changed both major industry and occupa 
tion.
Among skilled blue-collar workers, there was also a strong tendency 
to remain in a similar job and industry sector, despite variations in 
reemployment rates. Nationally, 62 percent of displaced skilled work 
ers were reemployed full time as of January 1986, but in booming New 
England and the South Atlantic, and in the moderately healthy West 
South Central, the reemployment rates for skilled workers were 74 
percent, 67 percent, and 67 percent, respectively. 8 In the East North 
Central, only 55 percent of displaced skilled workers had found new 
full-time jobs.
However, in each region, no less than 43 percent of skilled blue- 
collar workers became reemployed in similar jobs, and no more than 
44 percent changed industry and occupation. In the relatively healthy 
New England, Mid-Atlantic, and South Atlantic regions, for example, 
58 to 60 percent of the reemployed skilled workers found new, skilled 
blue-collar jobs, while the rest moved into semiskilled, white-collar, 
and service positions. In the other two (more economically distressed) 
regions, only about 45 percent of the skilled workers were reemployed
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in skilled jobs, with about half of the rest moving down into semi 
skilled blue-collar jobs.
Semiskilled workers were reemployed full time at above-average 
rates in New England (60 percent), the South Atlantic (58 percent), 
and the West South Central (59 percent), but struggled in the Mid- 
Atlantic (47 percent) and the East North Central (52 percent). In four 
out of the five divisions, however, the reemployed either remained 
largely semiskilled workers (43 to 48 percent), or moved into white- 
collar and service jobs (36 to 42 percent). However, in New England 
the boom in construction trades and in services allowed most of the 
displaced to either remain in semiskilled employment (54 percent) or 
move up into skilled positions (23 percent).
Among white-collar and service workers, regional economic condi 
tions had less of an impact. Since the number of jobs in these occu 
pations was expanding in all regions, reemployment rates were high, 
most of the displaced found new white-collar and service jobs, and 
most were reemployed in the high-growth sectors in their divisions. In 
the divisions that have been creating many white-collar jobs recently 
(New England, the South Atlantic, the West South Central), 18 to 24 
percent of the reemployed white-collar and service workers reported 
that they had "moved to a different city or county to look for work or 
to take a different job." It is likely that these high percentages of 
movers reflect the in-migration of white-collar workers from econom 
ically struggling regions.
To further assess the relationship between regional economic con 
ditions and worker readjustment, we grouped states according to their 
unemployment rate relative to the national average, and then compared 
unemployment durations, reemployment rates, and various mobility 
measures. The results revealed several important findings (tables 3.11 
and 3.12). First, it is clear that the likelihood and speed of reemploy 
ment is greater in low unemployment areas than in those areas expe 
riencing above average rates of joblessness. This generally holds 
across industry, occupation, education, age, and sex groups, although 
blue-collar workers and the less educated do appear to be more sen 
sitive to local economic conditions than their counterparts.
Second, almost regardless of local unemployment conditions, work-
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Table 3.11
Reemployment and Total Weeks of Unemployment Since Lost Job, 
by 1985 State Unemployment Rate8
27 + weeks of unemployment 
since lost job
















Exec., prof., and mgr. 
Technical
Sales
Admin, supp. /clerical 
Service
Craft and repair 
Semiskilled
Education
Less than H.S. graduate 
H.S. graduate 


























































































































































































a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 
20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a full-time, private, nonagricultural, 
wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent 
reduction in force, or slack work, without recall as of January 1986.
ers do appear to remain in the types of jobs and sectors from which they 
were laid off. While there is some evidence that mobility is inversely 
related to local unemployment rates, the relationship is not pronounced
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Table 3.12 
Reemployment Mechanisms, by 1985 State Unemployment Rate8
States States States
Reemployment mechanisms with high 





Changed major occupation/same industry
Changed major industry/same occupation
Changed major industry and occupation
Same major industry and occupation




Changed major occupation/same industry
Changed major industry/same occupation
Changed major industry and occupation
Same major industry and occupation




Changed major occupation/same industry
Changed major industry/same occupation
Changed major industry and occupation
Same major industry and occupation
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a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 
20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a full-time, private, nonagricultural, 
wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent 
reduction in force, or slack work, without recall as of January 1986.
and does not detract from the observed preference of workers to search 
for similar jobs.
If one approached this regional analysis with the hope that healthy 
areas could serve the twin goals of rapid reemployment and the move 
ment of workers into new and growing industries and occupations, 
then the findings are less than fully satisfying. While reemployment
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rates are indeed higher in the rapidly growing areas, the findings show 
that blue-collar job-losers are more likely to move into growth sectors, 
to change industries, and to find new occupations in those areas where 
economic conditions are relatively poor.
Why is there not more movement of the displaced across occupa 
tions and industries in booming New England and in the high-growth 
South Atlantic? After all, it would seem that these areas would be most 
likely to have skill shortages in high-growth fields. Part of the answer, 
in all probability, has to do with the fact that those regions which have 
experienced the most rapid growth in service-producing sectors, the 
lowest unemployment rates, and the greatest overall economic expan 
sion have, for the most part, had the smallest declines in their goods- 
producing employment. 9 For example, durable goods employment de 
clined between 1979 and 1985 by only 6 percent in New England and 
3 percent in the West South Central, while it increased by 16 percent 
in the South Atlantic. Displaced workers in these regions were no 
doubt faced with many more openings in durable goods manufacturing 
than were workers in the East North Central. Further, a slower rate of 
job decline in the healthy regions results in a smaller pool of displaced 
workers to begin with. Thus, those who do find themselves without 
jobs have less competition for the (larger) number of job openings.
As discussed earlier, the movement of workers back to their old 
industries and occupations is likely also a result of their inability to 
qualify for new, comparable-wage jobs. On a national basis, it was 
shown that obtaining such jobs was particularly difficult for high-wage 
workers holding blue-collar jobs in general, and skilled jobs in partic 
ular. Since some regions of the country have experienced more sub 
stantial change in their job structure than others, we examined this 
issue on a regional basis by comparing the characteristics of high-wage 
displaced workers with those of high-wage growth-sector workers.
Overall, our results confirm the national findings and also reveal that 
in some regions, the prospect of reemployment in a comparable-wage 
job is exceedingly difficult (table 3.13). For one thing, there are sharp 
differences between the characteristics of high-wage displaced workers 
and those employed in growth sectors. Across each of the five regions, 
growth-sector workers tend to be younger, better educated, and more
Table 3.13
Characteristics of Workers in the Highest Divisional Earnings 










Less than high school graduate 
High school graduate 
1-3 years post-high school 
4 + years post-high school
Occupation
Executive and professional 
Technical and related
Sales
Admin, support and clerical 
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a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a 
full-time, private, nonagricultural, wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent reduction in force, 
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likely to be employed in professional and other white-collar jobs than 
their displaced counterparts. Moreover, this general pattern tends to be 
much greater in some regions than others. In particular, displaced 
workers residing in the East North Central states appear to be much 
less well matched to growing industries than displaced workers in other 
regions. Just over a quarter had been previously employed in a growth 
sector at the time of layoff, compared to 54 percent of those from the 
West South Central states, and 48 percent of those from New England. 
Additionally, East North Central workers are overrepresented in blue- 
collar jobs and underrepresented in high-level, white-collar occupa 
tions when compared to both growth-sector workers in their region and 
displaced workers from other regions. It is not surprising, then, to find 
variations in the ability of these workers to obtain comparable-wage 
jobs (table 3.14).
Among the reemployed high-wage workers, those who had the 
highest probability of remaining in the high-wage quartile resided in 
the South Atlantic (69 percent) and New England (64 percent). 
Predictably, those least likely to maintain their position in the 
high-wage quartile resided in the West South Central (37 percent) and 
the East North Central (48 percent) regions. These patterns held up for 
skilled and semiskilled blue-collar workers, with the exception of the 
East North Central division. In the East North Central, 78 percent of 
the skilled workers and 57 percent of the semiskilled who were 
reemployed either maintained their position in the high-wage quartile 
or moved down into the high-middle quartile. These success rates 
were among the highest across the five divisions, lending support to 
the notion that workers in the East North Central division are reluctant 
or unable to change occupation and thus risk downward wage 
mobility.
But it still remains that workers in all regions change occupations 
and industries infrequently. Despite differences in economic condi 
tions and the rate and nature of economic change, the regional results 
present strong evidence of the movement of displaced workers back to 
their old fields of work. In all cases, this appears linked to regional 
economic conditions and human capital mismatches between displaced 
and other workers within each of the quartiles of the wage and salary
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Table 3.14
Postdisplacement Earnings Mobility for High- Wage 
______ Displaced Workers, by Selected Census Divisions3 ______
East West
New Mid- North South South
_________________________ England Atlantic Central Atlantic Central
Highest Divisional Earnings Quartile on Former Job 




























































































































a. Data from the January 1986 Current Population Survey. All data refer to individuals aged 
20-61 in January 1986. Displaced workers lost or left a full-time, private, nonagricultural, 
wage-salary job between January 1981 and January 1986 because of a plant closing, permanent 
reduction in force, or slack work, without recall as of January 1986.
distribution. In some regions, these differences have become so large 
that workers have very little prospect of transferring their human cap 
ital to new, comparable-wage jobs. Especially for high-wage workers, 
the only choice left is to engage in a long-term search for reemploy- 
ment opportunities in the layoff occupation and industry or risk a 
substantial earnings loss. While policies can be developed to help 
workers upgrade their education and skills for comparable-wage jobs, 
they would represent a sharp departure from the traditional, limited 
investment strategy used to date.
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Pulling the Pieces Together: A Multivariate Analysis
To this point, we have seen several pieces of a complex puzzle 
describing the reemployment and earnings outcomes following dis 
placement. It has been suggested that growing human capital gaps 
between declining and growing sectors have contributed to limited 
worker mobility and earnings losses. These gaps are evident through 
out the wage and salary distribution of employment, particularly in 
higher-wage jobs, and in those regions of the country experiencing 
large declines in goods-producing industries and blue-collar employ 
ment.
A key result implied by these findings is that movement into grow 
ing as well as comparable-wage jobs declines with predisplacement 
earnings. Higher-wage workers laid off from blue-collar jobs do not 
appear to have the training and education needed to obtain new high- 
wage jobs. As a result, they tend not to pursue reemployment in 
growth sectors, and instead search for jobs in the industries and occu 
pations from which they were laid off. In contrast, lower-wage work 
ers are better matched to new job opportunities, but are also at an 
educational disadvantage.
Recent studies of worker displacement have confirmed the important 
role of education and training in the labor market. 10 In most cases, 
both factors have been shown to be positively related to postlayoff 
reemployment and earnings, and negatively associated with earning 
loss. From a policy perspective, this suggests that educational upgrad 
ing and occupational training are needed in any set of programs de 
signed to facilitate successful readjustment following layoff.
Indeed, most policy analysts have concluded this and argued that 
training and education are needed to help laid-off workers find new 
jobs in the economy©s growth sectors. And on a general level, our 
findings on occupational and educational upgrading also support this 
assertion. It is clear that in today©s labor market, limited education and 
skills place one at a distinct disadvantage.
Despite this, it is also quite plausible that the limited movement of 
many displaced workers into growth sectors cannot be overcome with 
a single prescription of educational upgrading and skills training. As 
we discussed in chapter 2, growth industries are producing a variety of
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high- and lower-wage jobs that can accommodate workers with various 
education and training backgrounds. This would suggest that, holding 
other factors constant, education and training will not necessarily limit 
or facilitate entry into the economy©s growth industries. Entry could be 
limited, however, if workers search for jobs that rely on their existing 
skills. Especially among higher-wage workers, there are large mis 
matches between the skills of the displaced and those required in 
growing industries.
If this is the case, then the policy implications become more com 
plex. While it remains true that all workers can benefit from education 
and training, potentially costly investments may be required to help 
higher-wage workers adjust to changes in the structure of job oppor 
tunities. Absent training for new, comparable-wage jobs, the policy 
alternatives turn on helping workers return to the field from which they 
were laid off or obtain a lower-paying job in a growth industry. Lower- 
wage workers, in contrast, seem to be in a better position to benefit 
from a more modest investment strategy since they are better matched 
to jobs in growing sectors. Moreover, insofar as flexible labor market 
adjustment includes transitions from declining to growing sectors, the 
evidence would suggest that a mixed investment strategy may well be 
required.
In light of the strength of the findings presented thus far and their 
policy implications, we subjected them to more rigorous statistical 
testing. Specifically, we examined three key outcomes of interest that 
reflect the broad policy goals which seem to be achievable with vary 
ing degrees of difficulty. The first outcome (and that studied most 
often) is reemployment. "Reemployment" in this case is assessed in 
January 1986, for workers losing full-time jobs over the previous five 
years. The second outcome considered is reemployment in a divisional 
growth sector, which may improve economic efficiency and heighten 
future job security. Unlike reemployment alone, this outcome has 
received little attention in studies of worker displacement. The third 
outcome is reemployment in the same or higher divisional earnings 
quartile. This may be the most difficult outcome to achieve, but at 
least in the short term it is most desirable from the worker©s point of 
view. Earnings comparability is assessed for full-time workers losing
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jobs which were in the highest three divisional earnings quartiles, who 
subsequently were reemployed as of January 1986.
These three outcomes are "binary choice variables" a displaced 
worker is either reemployed or not; reemployed in a growth sector or 
not; or reemployed in a comparable-wage job or in a lower-wage job. 
Accordingly, a probit model was used to estimate the probabilities, 
while controlling for a standard set of worker characteristics and labor 
market conditions which may influence the three outcomes, including: 
age, education, race, industry, occupation, marital status, presence of 
children under 6, sex, and tenure on the former job. In addition, we 
also controlled for reason of displacement, receipt of advance notice of 
layoff, year of displacement, and state personal income growth over 
the 1979 to 1985 period. 11
Of particular interest, given the earlier findings, is the influence of 
human capital characteristics, (including educational background, job 
tenure, and prior industry/occupation), and regional economic condi 
tions (reflected by growth in state personal income). These results are 
presented in table 3.15 and discussed below.
Consistent with previous research, our findings show that the prob 
ability of reemployment increases with education, declines with age, 
and is relatively more difficult for blue-collar and manufacturing work 
ers than white-collar service workers. Tenure is also inversely related 
to reemployment, reflecting the difficulty those with long-term stable 
attachments to a particular firm have in finding new jobs. Similar 
results are also evident with respect to the probability of reemployment 
in the same or a higher wage and salary quartile. The less educated, 
blue-collar, manufacturing workers with substantial tenure all have 
significantly more difficulty than their counterparts finding jobs that 
offer wages comparable to those received in the layoff job. As dis 
cussed earlier, these results point to the general need for educational 
upgrading and occupational training in programs designed to facilitate 
the transition of laid-off workers into new jobs. 12
As expected, however, the results also reveal that neither education 
nor age have a statistically significant effect on the probability of 
reemployment in a growth sector. What does matter, and to a very 
large extent, is one©s prior occupational and industry attachment. Rel-
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Table 3.15
Estimated Probabilities of Reemployment Outcomes for
Workers Displaced from Full-Time Jobs Between
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NOTE: See appendix 3A for full results of the Probit Estimations. Probabilities estimated from
Z values of the normal distribution.
a. For those losing jobs in the three highest earnings quartiles, conditional upon reemployment
in 1/86.
b. Baseline characteristics include: unmarried, nonwhite male, high school graduate, age 25-34,
lost white-collar or service job in a service-producing sector in 1981 through a layoff without
advance notice, less than 4 years seniority, real state personal income growth 1979-85 at U.S.
average (16.4%).
*** Significant at 99 percent
** Significant at 95 percent
* Significant at 90 percent
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ative to service and white-collar workers, those from the manufactur 
ing sector with blue-collar skills are, holding other factors constant, 
substantially less likely to enter a growth sector. Moreover, the esti 
mated probabilities for these groups are anywhere between 2 and 13 
times larger than those obtained from the reemployment model. We 
can thus see that while growth industries have jobs for individuals with 
limited as well as advanced education and experience, they are less 
attractive or accessible to those from the industrial sector.
These findings help to explain why many blue-collar and manufac 
turing workers experience relatively long durations of joblessness. 
They also lend support to our earlier results suggesting that, at least in 
the eyes of the worker, comparable-wage reemployment is the most 
preferred reemployment outcome. The existence of skill mismatches at 
comparable-wage levels makes entry into growing industries a formi 
dable challenge that only increases with one©s earnings on the layoff 
job.
Earlier, we presented evidence suggesting that postlayoff adjust 
ment varies according to economic conditions and improves over time. 
These results are largely substantiated in the probit models. First, the 
probability of reemployment does, indeed, increase with time. While 
workers laid off in 1982 or 1983 were just as likely to be reemployed 
in January 1986 as those laid off in 1981, the 1984 job-losers were 7 
percent less likely than their 1981 counterparts to find a job. Those laid 
off in 1985 were 27 percent less likely to have found a job by January 
1986.
While time also appears to have influenced the probability of reem 
ployment in a growth sector, its effect is noticeably smaller than in the 
case of reemployment. In a similar fashion, economic conditions have 
no effect on the likelihood of reemployment. These results further 
support our earlier findings that the transition from declining to grow 
ing sectors can be quite difficult for many displaced workers. Even in 
growing states, displaced workers are not any more likely to become 
reemployed in a growth industry than they are in sluggish areas. And 
while time does increase the probability, it seems that it works in favor 
of reemployment in a nongrowth sector.
These findings have two important policy implications. The first is
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that the transition from declining to growing sectors, a key attribute of 
flexible labor market adjustment, is difficult for many workers. Those 
from the manufacturing sector are nearly 30 percent less likely to move 
into a growth-sector job than service sector employees, while blue- 
collar workers are between 12 and 14 percent less likely than their 
counterparts to do the same. While time and favorable economic con 
ditions improve reemployment and earnings prospects, they are less 
important in influencing movement into a growth industry. To the 
extent that these intersector transitions are viewed as important goals of 
employment policy, it is clear that achieving them represents a formi 
dable challenge.
The second implication is that the readjustment needs of workers 
varies as do the policy options available to address them. On the one 
hand, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests the less educated, 
older, and high-tenure worker will require special assistance in obtain 
ing reemployment. For these workers, and for lower-wage workers as 
well, reemployment options can include relatively modest investments 
in education and training for a wide variety of jobs in growing and 
declining sectors. For example, holding other factors constant, helping 
the less educated attain a high school diploma can increase the prob 
ability of reemployment by nearly 13 percentage points.
On the other hand, the findings indicate that providing assistance to 
manufacturing and blue-collar workers can be more complex and po 
tentially more costly. For one thing, programs will have to overcome 
the limited probability these workers have of entering growing indus 
tries. Since this appears linked to skills mismatches that rise with 
earnings, programs have two basic options: (1) intensive and costly 
retraining and educational upgrading for growth-sector jobs; or (2) 
reemployment in a field similar to that from which a worker was laid 
off. A third option is to assist a worker in lowering his or her expec 
tations and provide assistance in preparing for and finding "a job."
Given this, it would appear that the current policy approach of 
limited program investments will not be sufficient for all workers. 
While those losing relatively low-wage manufacturing jobs do stand to 
benefit from modest boosts to their education and training, higher- 
wage, blue-collar workers are another matter. These workers face such
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substantial gaps in their human capital, that it is unlikely that existing 
policies and programs can help them overcome their competitive dis 
advantage and obtain comparable-wage jobs. It would seem that unless 
policymakers are willing to explicitly accept earnings losses and the 
social and personal costs that result from them as program outcomes, 
a different framework will have to be developed to support flexible 
labor market adjustment.
NOTES
1. "Semiskilled," blue-collar occupations include operatives, assemblers, transportation han 
dlers, and laborers.
2. This translates into a national estimate of nearly 9 million displaced workers.
3. The layoff wages of displaced workers were inflated using the CPI to their January, 1986 
equivalents.
4. See, for example, Francis W. Horvath, "The Pulse of Economic Change: Displaced Workers 
of J981-85," Monthly Labor Review (June 1987); and Michael Podgursky and Paul Swaim, 
"Job Displacement and Earnings Loss: Evidence From the Displaced Worker Survey," Indus 
trial and Labor Relations Review (October 1987).
5. See Christopher J. Ruhm, "The Economic Consequences of Labor Mobility," Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review (October 1987); and Janice F. Madden, "The Distribution of 
Economic Losses Among Displaced Workers: Measurement Methods Matter," Journal of Hu 
man Resources (Winter 1988).
6. While this is comparable to the experience of all displaced workers, the fact remains that 
high-wage, skilled, blue-collar workers experienced very long durations of joblessness. Over 37 
percent reported being out of work for at least 27 weeks, in comparison to 29 percent of all 
workers and 17 percent of executive and professional workers.
7. To conduct this test, we relied on the same regression models presented in chapter 2. See 
appendix 2-B for the detailed results.
8. See appendix 3-A, table 3A-1 for regional reemployment rates by industry, occupation, and 
selected worker characteristics.
9. See table 3.9.
10. See: Michael Podgursky and Paul Swaim, "Job Displacement and Earnings Loss," Indus 
trial and Labor Relations Review, 41, 1 (October 1987).
11. The full probit results are presented in appendix 3-A.
12. We further tested for the importance of human capital and other variables by re-estimating 
the reemployment probit models for workers laid off from each quartile of the wage and salary 
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Table 3A-2
Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Reemployment Probabilities 
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a. For those losing jobs in the three highest divisional earnings quartiles, conditional on reem- 
ployment in January 1986.
*** Null hypothesis of H0 = 0 rejected at the 1% level.
** Null hypothesis of H0 = 0 rejected at the 5% level.
* Null hypothesis of H0 = 0 rejected at the 10% level.
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Table 3A-3
Estimated Reemployment Probabilities, by Former 
Earnings Quartiles of Dislocated Workers
Divisional earnings quartile (former job)
Baseline probability of
reemployment"
































































































a. See table 3.15 for complete description of baseline characteristics. Baseline age is 25-34 
years; baseline education is 12 years; baseline occupation is white-collar or service; baseline state 
personal income growth is the national average (16.4%). Full Probit results reported in table 
3A-4.
*** Significant at 99 percent
** Significant at 95 percent
* Significant at 90 percent
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Table 3A-4
Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Reemployment,


































































































































































































































































*** Null hypothesis of HO = 0 rejected at the 1% level.
** Null hypothesis of H0 = 0 rejected at the 5% level.
* Null hypothesis of H0 = 0 rejected at the 10% level.
4 
Creating a Responsive Policy Strategy
By this point, three developments in the U.S. labor market should be 
clear. The first is that, since 1979, unprecedented changes in the 
structure of job opportunities have occurred. This has been illustrated 
by the shift from blue- to white-collar employment, a decline in the 
growth of jobs in the middle of the wage and salary distribution, and 
substantial educational and skill upgrading in all jobs, and especially in 
higher-wage jobs. In some regions of the country, such as the Mid 
west, these changes have been much more pronounced and visible than 
in others. But in all areas, significant changes in the types and mix of 
jobs have occurred. This is not a new trend per se, but it is one that 
accelerated since the early 1980s.
The second development is that the labor market is not as flexible as 
what might be desired. Although the free flow of workers from de 
clining to growing sectors is desirable from an efficiency perspective, 
the evidence indicates that intersector mobility occurs infrequently. 
Overall, large proportions of displaced workers wind up finding new 
jobs in the same general sector from which they were laid off. Workers 
losing jobs in slow-growing sectors tend to remain in those sectors, and 
blue-collar workers, for the most part, return to blue-collar employ 
ment. While it is true that these and other workers do change industries 
and occupations, most of the changes are in the same broad sectors in 
which the layoff occurred. Worker mobility in the U.S. cannot be 
characterized by high levels of movement between declining and grow 
ing sectors of the economy.
The third development is that worker adjustment to economic 
change has been difficult and costly. Following layoff, some 30 per-
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cent of displaced workers are without work for more than 27 weeks, 
and one-third experience an earnings decline sufficient in size to drop 
them down at least one quartile in the wage and salary distribution. 
Moreover, earnings losses remain substantial even after controlling for 
differences in human capital and personal characteristics between dis 
placed and other workers. Our estimates indicate that the reemploy- 
ment earnings of displaced workers are 15 to 20 percent below those 
of other workers, and that these losses persist over time. While the 
findings do suggest that earnings recovery increases with time, it still 
takes the average male displaced worker five years to recoup fully his 
earnings, and at least two years to recover 50 percent of the loss.
These results suggest that federal policies are needed to speed up the 
reemployment process and help displaced workers limit their earnings 
loss. Long-term unemployment and earnings losses that are sustained 
for several years imply market imperfections that cannot be overcome 
easily by individual workers themselves. While it is true that many 
workers eventually recoup their earnings, this does not diminish the 
need for government assistance. Despite improving economic condi 
tions and recall, it remains the case that several years transpire before 
workers are able to fully recover from a layoff.
It is possible that workers experience earnings loss because they 
were overpaid on the layoff job relative to others with similar charac 
teristics. This could result from union affiliation, interindustry wage 
differentials, or selective layoff due to poor performance or low 
productivity. 1 Under any of these scenarios, the reemployment focus 
of federal policies would remain clear, but the case for limiting earn 
ings loss would be weakened. For the policy maker, the question would 
become whether society should bear the full cost of helping workers 
make up lost economic rents.
There is no doubt that economic rents are lost by many displaced 
workers. But as we discussed in chapter 2, it is also true that the size 
of these rents can be expected to vary substantially, and that not all are 
positive. Moreover, the issue of rents tends to be most associated with 
certain worker subgroups, and not all displaced workers. Overall, 
available evidence suggests that earnings decline cannot be attributed 
wholly to the loss of rents enjoyed on the layoff job. 2 There does seem
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to be a strong reason for concern over the declining earnings of dis 
placed workers. And it appears that changes in the structure and lo 
cation of job opportunities are playing an important role in shaping this 
problem.
Throughout the last two chapters, we have compiled evidence 
strongly suggesting that shifts in the structure and geographic location 
of jobs have presented displaced workers with substantial postlayoff 
adjustment difficulties. Within and across the wage and salary distri 
bution of employment as well as industry sectors, we have seen edu 
cational and occupational upgrading occurring at a pace far more rapid 
than in previous periods. We have also seen sharp differences in the 
composition of growing and declining jobs and between displaced 
workers and their growth-sector counterparts. These trends are espe 
cially evident in the upper half of the wage and salary distribution of 
employment and in certain regions of the country, such as the mid- 
western states. Overall, employers in the economy©s growing sectors 
are simply not looking for adult male workers with a limited education 
and industrial skills. To the contrary, they place a disproportionate 
emphasis on advanced education and training, a youthful and female 
workforce, and providing services rather than producing goods.
For the displaced worker, this creates the potential for a skills mis 
match that cannot be overcome easily. On average, growth industries 
have proportionately few jobs that rely on the skills and education of 
the displaced worker. While there are some jobs that are a good fit, 
they represent a relatively small share of all growing jobs. Faced with 
this, a return to a slow-growing or declining sector may represent the 
best way for many displaced workers to obtain jobs that require their 
skills and experience.
Indeed, our results showed that, regardless of occupational back 
ground or region of residence, workers do become reemployed in the 
same general sectors from which they were laid off. As would be 
expected, workers who make a change are among those experiencing 
the greatest earnings declines. Unless workers are willing to wait for 
familiar jobs to develop, they will be faced with having to choose 
between making an investment in retraining, education, and perhaps 
relocation, or accepting a job that makes limited use of their skills and
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experience. In many cases, this means a drop down the earnings lad 
der.
This dilemma is at the heart of much of the difficulty faced by 
displaced workers. It helps to explain why earnings loss may occur and 
also points to the overall difficulty workers face in obtaining compa 
rable-wage jobs. Such jobs indeed exist, but in many cases, they are so 
different from those formerly held by the displaced that substantial 
investments in retraining and education would be required to increase 
accessibility to them. While such investments may be desirable, their 
implied magnitude serves to question their feasibility for both the 
individual worker and federal policy.
As would be expected, large investments are not necessarily re 
quired for all displaced workers. Our results also indicate that worker 
adjustment to economic change varies by subgroup. In particular, there 
are certain groups which, following layoff, face considerable difficulty 
in simply finding another job. Less educated, older workers, those 
with accumulated tenure, and workers with blue-collar skills all have 
reemployment rates that are significantly lower than those of their 
counterparts. These same groups do not, however, necessarily expe 
rience equal difficulty in obtaining a comparable-wage job.
The ability of displaced workers to obtain comparable-wage jobs 
depends, in large part, on where they stood in the wage and salary 
distribution at the time of layoff. As we discussed in chapters 2 and 3, 
the problem of comparable-wage reemployment is most acute among 
those losing higher-wage jobs. Typically, the average high-wage 
worker in the U.S. is relatively well educated, has advanced training, 
and works in the service sector. In comparison, workers displaced 
from high-wage jobs earned that position largely through on-the-job 
skills that are not tied to formal educational achievement. Only one- 
quarter have a college diploma, nearly half have not gone beyond high 
school, and over 50 percent held blue-collar positions.
At lower wage levels, there are fewer disparities between the edu 
cation and training backgrounds of displaced workers and those of 
either all full-time workers or growth-sector employees. Although such 
gaps exist, they have been shown to be smaller in magnitude. For the 
most part, displaced workers in the lower half of the wage and salary
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distribution are much better matched to new growing jobs than their 
higher-wage counterparts.
As a result, it is not surprising that earnings recovery varies inversely 
with layoff wages or that higher-wage workers have less intersector 
mobility than their lower-wage counterparts. The evidence indicates 
clearly that many higher-wage job-losers qualify for few of the white- 
collar service jobs available at comparable wages, while lower-wage 
workers have a broader spectrum of opportunities from which to choose. 
This problem of skills match is particularly acute for the less educated 
as well as those semiskilled blue-collar workers losing higher-wage 
jobs. While 49 percent of all high-wage workers found new, high-wage 
jobs, only 29 percent of semiskilled workers were able to do the same.
We can thus see that for many groups, relatively modest investments 
in remedial education, entry-level job training, and job search assis 
tance can be potentially valuable. In particular, workers from the lower 
half of the wage and salary distribution appear most likely to be able 
to benefit from such an approach. While limited investments can also 
potentially help higher-wage displaced workers find another job, they 
will likely do little to offset this group©s loss in earnings. For these 
workers, substantial investments in education and retraining will be 
required to increase accessibility to comparable-wage jobs. Although 
the size of such investments may well be outside the bounds that 
taxpayers have thus far been willing to authorize, this does not imply 
that comparable-wage reemployment is infeasible. It may simply mean 
that changes in existing programs are necessary or that new institutions 
and financing mechanisms for promoting flexible labor market adjust 
ment are required.
If these developments were simply the result of the last recession, 
they could be viewed as temporary and requiring short-term labor 
market adjustment strategies. By all accounts, however, they are part 
of a longer-term trend which accelerated in the early 1980s, and which 
is projected to continue well into the future. Over the next several 
years, jobs are expected to change more frequently and demand more 
skills and training; at the same time, fewer workers will be available to 
fill them. Between now and the year 2000, the nation©s labor force is 
projected to grow more slowly and age more quickly than at any time
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since the 1930s. 3 These trends will only heighten the importance of 
flexible labor market adjustment, particularly among experienced 
workers such as those recently displaced from their jobs.
This creates a policy context that cannot be viewed as short term or 
necessarily focused solely on displaced workers. While recent job- 
losers are indeed in need of assistance, their problems can also be seen 
as a reflection of the types of challenges that the U.S. will have to face 
in the future. Educational upgrading, occupational retraining, and fre 
quent job changing will become more the norm than an exception to an 
otherwise stable and uninterrupted career.
Within this context, the policy challenges are substantial. In the 
short term, displaced workers require assistance in finding new jobs, 
preferably ones that make use of their experience and skills. Over the 
longer term, however, these policies will have to evolve into a broader 
framework that can facilitate labor market adjustment on as well as off 
the job.
In this final chapter, we address these policy concerns by drawing 
on the findings presented in earlier chapters to sketch out a strategic 
response to continued economic change. We begin with the short-term 
policy issues and then move on to a larger policy framework for 
facilitating future flexible labor market adjustment.
Repositioning Existing Policy
Recently, the Congress enacted new trade legislation to strengthen 
the competitiveness of the American economy. Among the provisions 
of this legislation is a new program for displaced workers that replaces 
Title III of JTPA. The new program the Economic Dislocation and 
Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA) is expected to bolster 
the economy©s performance by facilitating the return of displaced 
workers to productive employment.
The EDWAA program is also designed to build upon the lessons 
learned under Title III. It contains a number of legislative provisions 
intended to strengthen the country©s response to the labor market con 
sequences of displacement. For one thing, the legislation recognizes 
the importance of income support to participation in training. While
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Title III contained no provision for needs-based payments, EDWAA 
authorizes income support payments up to 25 percent of all program 
expenditures.
The new legislation is also intended to develop a closer link between 
worker adjustment programs and the unemployment insurance system. 
It requires coordination between the two programs and directly links 
the receipt of income support payments to a UI beneficiary©s willing 
ness to participate in training.
In addition to coordination, the new legislation contains a number of 
other provisions aimed at improving the delivery of programs. It re 
quires the establishment of special rapid-response units in each state to 
address permanent business closures or mass layoffs, authorizes the 
use of flexible voucher certificates to purchase training for up to two 
years, and mandates that no less than 40 percent of the funds received 
by a state be allocated, by formula, to local areas. 4 Authorized at 
nearly one billion dollars, the EDWAA legislation is viewed as a major 
step in creating a national program to address worker displacement and 
facilitate flexible labor market adjustment.
What the legislation does not change, however, is the broad flexi 
bility states and localities have in choosing who to serve and deter 
mining the services to offer. As with Title III, these decisions, as well 
as choices over program goals and objectives, remain a matter of state 
and local discretion. In some areas of the country, programs will 
emphasize retraining workers from specific industries or occupations, 
while in others, the emphasis may be on serving a steady flow of 
unemployment insurance recipients. But if history is any guide, the 
types of help workers receive under EDWAA will likely be similar to 
those provided under Title III. Programs will offer a mix of short-term, 
placement-oriented services together with educational remediation and 
skills training. On average, the investments will be modest and within 
conventional norms. 5
As we have seen from the experience of displaced workers, this 
strategy will not necessarily fulfill the needs of all individuals or sec 
tors of the economy. While it can readily fill vacancies by facilitating 
worker reemployment, it cannot as easily limit mismatches or earnings 
loss. Some workers, including the less educated and blue-collar work-
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ers losing higher-wage jobs, are simply not in a position to transfer 
their skills to new, comparable-wage jobs. The program expenditures 
and personal investments required to build new skills, and often new 
careers, may simply be too great to support within the framework of 
existing federal programs. These workers may still be able to derive 
benefits from relatively modest investments in training and education, 
however. Although they may experience large earnings losses, pro 
grams have the potential of helping these individuals to work and earn 
more than they would be able to on their own.
There are also other experienced workers who may be able to benefit 
from a short-term, modest investment strategy. As we discussed ear 
lier, workers in the lower half of the wage distribution with limited 
education and from semiskilled and unskilled jobs may be in a position 
to benefit most from placement and training assistance in a wide va 
riety of occupational fields. Because of the large number of growing 
jobs for which these workers qualify, programs can potentially help 
them find a new job and avoid large earnings losses.
To date, studies of the effectiveness of displaced worker programs 
have not focused on differences in impacts between high- and 
lower-wage workers. The findings from three recent large-scale 
evaluations indicate, however, that training and placement programs 
for displaced workers can increase employment and earnings. Overall, 
the three studies show positive and significant effects of program 
participation on postlayoff employment and earnings. 6 Although the 
magnitudes of the reported effects vary in size, they provide a strong 
reason to believe that training and placement programs of the type 
offered under JTPA can have a positive influence on the postlayoff 
adjustment process of displaced workers. 7 In one study, set in 
Buffalo, New York, the weekly earnings of program participants were 
estimated to have increased by $115, while another study of programs 
in Houston and El Paso, Texas, reported average quarterly earnings 
gains of $550.
At the same time, both the Texas and Buffalo studies report that 
program participants experienced large earnings losses relative to the 
layoff job. 8 Although these losses are not as great as they would have 
been in the absence of the program, they still represent significant
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declines. In the Buffalo evaluation, for example, 72 percent of pro 
gram participants became reemployed in jobs offering weekly wages 
that paid no more than 75 percent of those received on the layoff jobs. 
In Texas, similar results emerged one year after program participa 
tion, displaced workers were earning no more than roughly 60 percent 
of what they earned on the layoff job.
While neither study specifically analyzed earnings loss, it is instruc 
tive that each of the programs enrolled individuals who, by and large, 
were formerly employed in relatively high-wage jobs. In comparison 
to the $8.51 an hour earned by all production and nonsupervisory 
manufacturing workers in the U.S. during 1983, workers in the Buf 
falo program lost jobs paying an average of $10.78 per hour. In the 
Texas programs, 55 percent of enrolled workers earned $13.52 an hour 
on the layoff job. In view of the adjustment problems faced by higher- 
wage workers, the observed earnings losses are not surprising. As 
expected, they suggest that modest investments in training and place 
ment programs can favorably impact earnings, but not to the degree 
needed to substantially restore lost earnings. 9
Whether greater investments would yield more favorable results is 
unclear. The evidence available suggests that, at least within the range 
of investments made by JTPA, this may not be the case. 10 In each of 
the three evaluations, some effort was made to assess the relative 
effectiveness of job search assistance and the more costly classroom 
skills training. Although selection bias and other methodological con 
siderations affected the findings of each study, they each reported 
little, if any difference in the effectiveness of the two program alter 
natives. Given that job search assistance is the less expensive of the 
two, it was reported consistently as the more cost-effective strategy.
Understanding why skills training does not appear to be as cost- 
effective as the less expensive job search assistance is a key issue 
warranting further investigation. All available evidence indicates that 
some amount of educational upgrading and retraining is critical for 
most dislocated workers. While the observed findings may reflect 
inefficiencies in program operations, they may also suggest the need 
for more costly and intensive training. In other words, for training to 
make a difference, especially for higher-wage workers, it may have to
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be substantially more intensive than what is currently offered by public 
employment and training programs.
The feasibility of extensive educational upgrading and occupational 
retraining is, however, unclear. On the one hand, public employment 
and training programs have had limited experience providing experi 
enced, adult workers with costly, long-term education and training 
services. Moreover, participation in such programs can be costly for 
the worker who ultimately needs a job, and needs one relatively 
quickly. Although income support payments, such as unemployment 
insurance, are available to defray part of these costs, they are relatively 
short term and not sufficiently long to correspond with a program effort 
that may well require one or more years. Unless programs are able to 
shift their primary focus from daytime participation for unemployed 
workers to also include evening programs for many individuals who 
must return to work quickly, it may simply be impractical to consider 
increasing the cost and intensity of training programs.
On the other hand, even if it were feasible to offer long-term training 
and education services, the cost may simply be too great for society 
itself to incur. It may also not be fully warranted since many displaced 
workers are able to recoup their earnings over time. From an invest 
ment perspective, the benefits of additional training and education 
services would have to be balanced by the eventual self-recovery of 
many workers as well as the value of any lost economic rents.
If only implicitly, society has already addressed this issue. The 
public employment and training system for displaced workers acts 
much like a safety net; it catches workers affected by economic change 
and helps them get back on their feet and back to work. The costs of 
change both economic and personal are shared by the worker and 
society. In the current policy framework, society bears some of the 
cost of readjustment, but thus far, has not authorized spending levels 
sufficient to account for the full cost of economic change and individ 
ual adjustment to it.
In view of this, one option is to shift the policy focus from the 
individual to the family. In many respects, the family is the appropriate 
policy focus since displacement affects the labor force participation of 
its members as well as its overall income level and status.
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Recent studies have revealed that displacement of married men stim 
ulates employment and earnings among wives. In one recent study, for 
example, it was shown that increased labor force participation among 
wives helped to cushion part of a husband©s lost earnings. 11 While this 
amounted to only 30 percent of the lost earnings in a quarter of all 
families, it provides some promise for policies aimed at increasing the 
employment and earnings of nonworking wives. Two-earner families 
are a common occurrence today, and have provided a vehicle for 
American families to maintain their standard of living. 12 To the extent 
that programs reorient their attention to the family unit, they can help 
displaced-worker families offset the earnings loss experienced by a 
spouse and maintain their standard of living as well.
Another option is to reconsider the current policy framework, in 
cluding its financing. Publicly-financed training programs, such as 
Title III and the new EDWAA program, find it difficult to respond to 
changing education and skill requirements because they operate out of 
the flow of economic change and only after workers have been af 
fected. Retraining and education policies outside the context of work 
cannot be expected to help workers fully prepare for new skill require 
ments, new jobs, or career changes. They can only "catch" workers 
at a time when the need for change is most pressing. At this point, 
practical considerations, public expectations, and cost constraints limit 
potential training and family investments and dictate relatively expe 
dient solutions. As much value as this approach has, it falls short of 
representing a framework for facilitating adjustment to change. Policy 
needs to be repositioned from its exclusive focus on the effects of 
change to the process of change itself.
Forging Future Policy
All signals indicate that a new framework is needed to facilitate on- 
as well as off-the-job labor market adjustment. Continued economic 
restructuring, additional worker layoffs, a slow-growing and aging 
labor force, and increasing demands for a competent and flexible 
workforce will make ongoing training and development vital to both 
the economy and its workers. Yet in the U.S. today, virtually no public
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policy exists to stimulate training and education directly and on a 
continuing basis.
This is not because there is fundamental disagreement among poli- 
cymakers over the importance of such goals. Nor is it the result of 
limited training institutions or ideas and proposals for how to best 
promote flexible labor force adjustment. It is now widely recognized 
that the future well-being of the economy and its workers will require 
policies that support adjustment to continued changes in the structure 
and content of jobs. And indeed, several proposals and ideas that 
would use the tax system to leverage on-the-job training and education 
funds have been developed. 13 Then why has policy development been 
so slow in moving? At the center of the problem are a complex set of 
issues that deal as much with basic policy principles and goals as they 
do with operations and administrative concerns.
For one thing, the issue of general versus specific training has served 
to muddy the policy waters by raising the question of who shall benefit 
from such policies. As things now stand, private employers have an 
interest in their workers acquiring skills and capabilities related di 
rectly to their jobs this enhances on-the-job productivity and limits 
the extent to which workers can take their new skills to other compet 
ing employers. While workers can also benefit from specific training, 
the acquisition of more general skills and abilities is what is often 
needed to prepare for job and career changes, whether they be with an 
existing or new employer. Since tax dollars are typically viewed as the 
principal source of revenue to support more general on-the-job training 
and education, resolving this issue stands squarely in the path of new 
policy development. Moreover, the public demands, and rightly so, 
that financial support be withheld from activities that would have 
occurred in the absence of any intervention. Since it is well known that 
firms already support significant levels of on-the-job training, it is not 
clear whether new public monies will substitute for or expand that 
which already occurs.
These questions of policy purpose and control are exacerbated by the 
current division of responsibility for tax-based economic policies and 
those relying on existing public revenues and institutions. Currently in 
the Congress, there is one policy structure that deals with overall
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economic and tax policy (e.g. Ways and Means, Economic Commit 
tees, the Treasury), and another that addresses human resources de 
velopment policy through existing public bureaucracies (the Labor and 
Human Resource Committee in the Senate and the Education and 
Labor Committee in the House). Title III and the EDWAA program, 
for example, fall into the latter group while tax policy to leverage 
on-the-job education and training funds are the purview of the former 
group. The problem is that these two policy groups have tended to 
focus on complementary but different sets of issues. Because the 
emerging need for on-the-job funding of skill and educational devel 
opment borders the mission of both camps, policy development can 
only be achieved if these two groups join forces on common ground.
Any effort to extend the public employment and training system 
must contend with these issues. However, in doing so, one need not 
presume that it is government©s full responsibility to finance the costs 
of such efforts. Is it not the case that individuals and employers also 
benefit from continued education and training, and therefore have 
some responsibility for cost sharing? If so, it would follow that one 
role of public policy could be to stimulate such joint arrangements and 
create a framework for continued training and education.
Some firms and organizations, most notably in the unionized sector, 
have taken up these issues and provide at least one basic model for 
others to consider. In the auto, steel, and telecommunications indus 
tries, for example, labor and management have used the collective 
bargaining process to develop joint programs that support the contin 
ued development of employees. 14 While the nature of these programs 
varies, the programs share several important characteristics. First, they 
are all privately funded, in some cases by the companies and in others 
by employees as well. Public funds, if they are used, represent only a 
small share of total funding, and have been leveraged on the basis of 
existing private resources and capabilities.
Second, these programs focus on both displaced workers and active 
employees. In so doing, they recognize the readjustment problems of 
laid-off employees as well as the importance of continued, on-the-job 
training and development. Third, these initiatives stress individual 
personal development as much as they do job-specific training. Last,
124 FROM ONE JOB TO THE NEXT
and perhaps most important, is that these joint programs represent an 
effort to recast the long held promise of job security in terms of career 
security. By providing workers with resources, information, and train 
ing, it is expected that they will be more prepared to cope with the 
changing needs of the workplace and adjust successfully to the forces 
of economic change and displacement.
Projecting such joint programs to other sectors, and particularly the 
nonunionized sector, is quite ambitious. Differences in political, cost, 
and competitive pressures suggest that replication will be difficult. 
But, it is clear that the constraints of public spending limit the types 
and nature of education and training that can be provided to workers 
on, as well as off, the job. Today©s workers affected by economic 
change appear to require a level of assistance beyond that provided by 
public programs alone. And tomorrow©s workers will also need assis 
tance to support their continued adaptation to changes in the structure 
and content of jobs. Policy makers must therefore overcome institu 
tional barriers to creative program strategies and devise new ways to 
stimulate the emergence of new structures to facilitate the process of 
economic change. Only then can the U.S. address successfully the dual 
challenge of facilitating productive adjustment and insulating workers 
from the negative consequences of economic change.
NOTES
1. Each of these explanations can also be used to explain the longer-term unemployment 
experienced by displaced workers. Faced with losing all or a portion of the economic rents they 
enjoyed on the layoff job, workers, and especially those from high-rent industries such as 
manufacturing, can be viewed as preferring to wait for another high-wage job to develop rather 
than take one offering lower wages. See, for example: Lawrence Summers, "Why is Unem 
ployment So Very High Near Full Employment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 
(1986).
2. See chapter 2 for a discussion of these points.
3. For a comprehensive review of projected labor force changes, see: William B. Johnston, 
Workforce 2000: Work and Workers for the 21st Century. Indianapolis: The Hudson Institute, 
1987, chapter 3.
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10. In a recent study of 563 Title III projects funded under JTPA, the General Accounting Office 
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32 percent of the projects offering services that lasted for less than six weeks. Median weeks of 
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December, 1987.
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